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1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Private information is transmitted in organizationsduring thedecision-makingprocess.
One typical information transmission method is ordinary and informal talk, which we
call “cheap talk.” Cheap talk itself does not aect the payos of parties. However,
what it conveys often aects future decision making. Then, parties may transmit their
private information strategically.
The main purpose of this thesis is to develop cheap talk models that capture the
strategic interaction between the decision maker’s active (and strategic) participation
in the communication process and information transmission. We aim to answer the
following two questions: (i) when/how can information transmission be improved by
the receiver’s active participation in the communication process (e.g., compensating
the sender for his messages) and (ii) can the decision maker’s strategic access to a
source of information except the informed parties facilitate communication, and if so,
how should the decision maker gather additional information?
The seminal analysis of the cheap talk game was provided by Crawford and
Sobel (1982) (CS hereafter). The CS model has only two players: an informed party
(sender or he) and an uninformed decisionmaker (receiver or she). Each of themmoves
in the following decision process:1
1. A state 2  is drawn from a given probability distribution. The sender privately
observes the value of .
2. He sends a message m 2 M to the receiver depending on the state . We denote
byM the set of available messages.
1Mintzberg (1979) describes a decision process in an organization as the flow of decision making from
(i) information to (ii) advice to (iii) choice to (iv) authorization to (v) execution: (i) collecting information
to pass onto the decision maker; (ii) presenting advice to the decision maker; (seeking advice); (iii)
determining what is intended to be done; (iv) authorizing what is to be done; and (v) executing what is,
in fact, done. To study the strategic interaction between (ii) advice and (iii) choice, a number of studies
introduce and analyze models in which the communication protocols and specifications of who controls
which decisions are fixed.
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3. After receiving the message m from the sender, the receiver chooses an action
y 2 Y.
4. Players receive payos, ur(y; ) and us(y; ), depending on the state  and the
action y.
CS study a model where both the set of actions and the set of states are one-
dimensional.2 They assume that the player’s payo function, ui, is twice continuously
dierentiable, that ui(; ) is single peaked for each , and that ui satisfies the single-
crossing condition ui12 > 0. In other words, players have an ideal action for each state,
and each of the players’ ideal actions is a strictly increasing function of the value of the
state. The sender has a uniform bias, i.e., his ideal action is always strictly greater than
that of the receiver. Themajor results of CS are that the existence of the incentive conflict
between the sender and receiver typically prevents the full revelation of information
and that there exists a partially informative equilibrium when the incentive conflict is
not too large.3 Moreover, they show that all equilibria are finite partition equilibria:
the sender’s message conveys information about the interval in which the state lies.4
As an example of the CS model, consider the situation where a CEO consults a
strategic planner before making a corporate decision. On the one hand, the CEO is
interested in the future of the company. On the other hand, the strategic planner may
be interested not only in the success of the company but also in his own human capital.
In such a situation, the interest of the strategic planner and that of the CEO do not
coincide. This creates an incentive for the strategic planner to withhold information or
misrepresent it so as to deceive the CEO into choosing decisions that are desirable for
the strategic planner. Then, the CEO needs to take account of such strategic behavior
by the strategic planner.
Since the seminal work by CS, the central issues addressed in studies of cheap talk
models can be divided into the following three categories: designing communication
protocols, designing the allocation of decision rights, and communication in the sit-
uation where the receiver can be partially informed. In what follows, we review the
2Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2007) study a multidimensional model. Let (1; 2) 2   R2 be the
state. In this two-dimensional setting, the sender can send a message such as “1 > 2” or “1 < 2.”
Thesemessages have no information about the realized value of (1; 2). However, when the set of actions
is multidimensional, information can be transmitted through these messages.
3Battaglini (2002) and Ambrus and Takahashi (2008) analyzemultidimensional cheap talk models with
multiple senders. The existence the other sender’s advice can prevent a sender fromdeceiving the receiver
into choosing a decision that is desirable for him. As a result, the full revelation of information could be
generically possible, even when the conflict of interest is arbitrarily large.
4There always exists a completely uninformative equilibrium. This means that there is a multiple-
equilibrium problem. Farrell (1993) and Chen et al. (2008) address this problem by inducing some
equilibrium refinements.
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central studies that are closely related to this thesis.
First, we review studies in the first category, namely designing communication
protocols. Recent studies of the cheap talk game highlight that there exists a commu-
nication protocol in which players’ payos improve from the ex ante viewpoint. One
typical method that improves information transmission is “adding noise into commu-
nication.” Three studies analyze this class of communication protocol, namely Krishna
and Morgan (2004), Blume et al. (2007), and Goltsman et al. (2009).
Krishna and Morgan (2004) study a two-period bilateral communication game
where both the sender and the receiver send messages to each other. They show
that when the bias is not too high, there exists an equilibrium whose outcomes Pareto-
dominate all the equilibrium outcomes in the CS model. In their communication pro-
tocol, the sender conveys some information about the state and the receiver’s messages
play a role in generating stochastic public signals. Since the decision maker makes a
decision depending on these signals, the uncertainty generated by this communication
exposes the sender to risk. This weakens the sender’s incentive to misrepresent his
private information.
Blume et al. (2007) study a unilateral communication game with communication
error. This communication error is generated exogenously, whereas, in the model of
Krishna and Morgan (2004), the noise in communication is generated endogenously in
the equilibrium. Blume et al. (2007) assume that the sender’s message does not reach
the receiver with a positive probability. Instead, the receiver receives a message drawn
from an exogenously given probability distribution. They show that there exists a level
of noise that makes it possible for players to obtain higher ex ante expected payos
than those in the CS model. Similar to Krishna and Morgan (2004), the existence of
communication error induces a lottery over the decisions chosen by the decisionmaker.
This uncertainty exposes the sender to risk.
Goltsman et al. (2009) study three decision processes: negotiation, mediation, and
arbitration. Here, we review the first two, negotiation and mediation, which are
concerned with the design of communication protocols. Later, we review arbitration,
which is concerned with designing the allocation of decision rights.
Negotiation is multiple-period bilateral communication that is a natural extension
of Krishna andMorgan (2004). Goltsman et al. (2009) show that when the bias is small,
only two periods are required to achieve the optimal equilibrium under which the
receiver’s ex ante expected payo is maximized.
Under mediation, a neutral third party can ask the sender for information and
advise the receiver. The receiver makes a (best response) decision given this advice.
Goltsman et al. (2009) show that when the incentive conflict between the receiver and
sender is not too large, mediation can improve the receiver’s ex ante expected payo
4 1. Introduction
by allowing the mapping from the sender’s messages to the advice to be stochastic.
Moreover, they characterize the optimal mediation rule that maximizes the receiver’s
ex ante expected payo.5 The outcome of an equilibrium under the optimal mediation
rule (weakly) Pareto-dominates all the equilibrium outcomes in negotiation and the
model provided by Blume et al. (2007). This finding implies that optimal mediation is
a strong candidate as the most eective communication protocol for the receiver.
All the studies mentioned above focus on the problem of designing communication
protocols. Next, we review studies in the second category: designing the allocation of
decision rights. The designing problem regarding the allocation of decision rights (i.e.,
determining “who decides what”) is called the delegation problem.
Holmstro¨m (1977) was the first to formulate the general class of delegation prob-
lems. In the delegation problem, players move in the following decision process:
1. The receiver delegates the decision-making authority to the sender by choosing
a delegation set X  Y, which is the set of available actions for the sender.
2. A state 2  is drawn from a given probability distribution. The sender privately
observes the value of .
3. The sender chooses an action y 2 X depending on the state.
4. Players receive their payos depending on the state and action: ur(y; ) and
us(y; ).
Holmstro¨m (1977) provides the conditions for the solution of this contracting problem
to exist and examines several examples.
According to the revelation principle, we can restrict attention to the direct contract,
x : ! Y.6 For details, see Alonso and Matouschek (2008).
5Ivanov (2010) investigates communication via a strategic mediator. He shows that by using a strategic
mediator whose preferences are determined by the receiver, one can implement the optimal mediation
mechanism.
6In this case, the game proceeds as follows:
1. The receiver selects a direct contract (; x), where x : ! Y is a decision rule that maps the (direct)
message onto action x 2 Y.
2. A state  2  is drawn from a given probability distribution.
3. The sender privately observes the value of .
4. He sends a message ˜ 2  to the receiver depending on the state he observed.
5. After receiving the message ˜ from the sender, the receiver chooses an action according to the
decision rule x(˜).
6. Players receive their payos depending on the state and action: ur(x(˜); ) and us(x(˜); ).
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Melumad and Shibano (1991) characterize optimal predetermined decision rule that
maximizes the receiver’s expected payo in the model where players’ utility functions
are quadratic and the prior probability distribution over  is uniform.7 They provide
the conditions for the optimal predetermined decision rule to be an interval delegation
where the receiver delegates the decision-making authority to the sender by choosing
a delegation set (i.e., a subset of the set of all actions) that consists of a single and
non-degenerate interval.
Goltsman et al. (2009) tackle the problem of designing the optimal predetermined
decision rule that maximizes the receiver’s expected payo in more general settings.
Precisely, they consider stochastic mechanisms (i.e., arbitration), that is, xˆ :  ! (Y).
Under arbitration, a neutral third party (i.e., an arbitrator) can ask the sender for
information and commit to a predetermined potentially stochastic decision rule.
Goltsman et al. (2009) show that under any optimal arbitration mechanism, the
predetermined decision rule is deterministic. Optimal arbitration includes optimal
delegation. Recall that under the mediation, we consider the predetermined stochastic
mechanismsuchas xˆ : ! (Y), but the receiver cannotwrite a contract. Therefore, the
optimal mediation rule is a solution of a maximizing problemwhich is more restrictive
than the optimal arbitration rule. Hence, the outcomes under the optimal arbitration
rule strictly Pareto-dominate those under the optimal mediation rule.
Holmstro¨m (1977), Melumad and Shibano (1991), andGoltsman et al. (2009) assume
that the receiver can commit herself to the predetermined decision rule: X, x(), and
xˆ(), respectively. Dessein (2002) studies the delegation problem where the receiver
cannot commit herself to any predetermined decision rule. In his model, the receiver
chooses whether to communicate with the sender. She then makes a decision herself
or fully delegates the decision-making authority to the sender. He shows that the
receiver prefers full delegation to communication as long as the incentive conflict is
not too large. Since the work of Dessein (2002), the problem of “when players should
communicate (or delegate) in an organization” has been the object of extensive study.
Note that optimal arbitration is more eective than communication. Moreover, optimal
delegation is always no worse than full delegation. Hence, if the receiver can write a
contract that determines the decision making ex ante, then communication (without
transfer) is not necessary for good decision making.
In Chapter 2, we introduce a new communication protocol, termedmultistage infor-
mation transmission with voluntary monetary transfer, which could strictly dominate
the outcome under the optimal arbitration rule.
Finally, we review studies in the third category: communication in the situation
7Alonso and Matouschek (2008) allow for more general probability distributions of the state and more
general payo functions.
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where the receiver can be partially informed. Two types of models analyze cheap talk
models: (i) the sender is completely informed and the receiver is partially informed
and (ii) both the sender and the receiver are partially informed.
Moreno de Barreda (2013) and Ishida and Shimizu (2016) study the former type
of model. They show that when the receiver has private information, communication
can be facilitated. The key factor to the receiver’s private information facilitating
communication is as follows. If the decision maker has some information, then the
decision maker’s private information can generate risk for the sender. Namely he faces
a higher level of uncertainty than the case in which the decision maker has no private
information. In such a case, he may attempt to reduce this risk by sending a more
precise message to the decision maker.
Watson (1996) and Ishida and Shimizu (2015) analyze the latter type of model
and show that it is possible for the sender to convey his private information to the
receiver completely. The key factor of the truth-telling in the situation where both the
sender and the receiver have imperfect information is that the more the decision maker
becomes informed, the more she becomes able to make a desirable decision for both
the sender and the receiver. In such a situation, the sender is willing to convey his
private information so that the decision maker makes a decision based on accurate
information.
The idea that parties may transmit information through cheap talk advice has
been scrutinized in many environments.8 An interesting research agenda is that the
receiver’s active participation in the communication process. For example, Aumann
and Hart (2003) and Krishna and Morgan (2004) consider a model where messages are
sent not only by the sender but also by the receiver. However, only a few works on the
topic exist, as the majority of studies of the cheap talk game assume that the receiver
is passive in the communication process (i.e., only the sender sends messages). In this
thesis, we address this issue by constructing and analyzing models where the receiver
strategically participates in the communication process.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we show
that the multistage strategic information transmission game with voluntary monetary
8There are researches other than communication, namely money burning, persuasion (or information dis-
closure), and Bayesian persuasion. For more details, see also Sobel (2011) and Gibbons and Roberts (2013).
Austen-Smith and Banks (2000) and Kartik (2007) develop the CS model by allowing the sender to use
costly messages: cheap talk with signaling or money burning. In the persuasion model analyzed, infor-
mation is transmitted through (partially) verifiable messages. Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) are
seminal works on information being transmitted by persuasion (disclosure). Seidman and Winter (1997)
and Mathis (2008) study persuasion in the framework of the CS model. Bayesian persuasion is analyzed
by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). In this model, one party attempts to control the decision maker’s
belief by changing the design of a public signal.
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transfer can be a strong candidate for an eective communication protocol for organi-
zations. In Chapter 3, we showwhat information the receiver should gather to achieve
eective communication. In the model in Chapter 4, we discuss when the receiver
should seek advice in the situation where she can gather information.
Summaries of the chapters are provided in the next section.
1.2 Summary of the Analysis
In Chapter 2, we construct a multistage strategic information transmission game with
voluntary monetary transfer. In this game, an informed sender can send messages to
an uninformed receiver more than once, and the uninformed receiver can pay money
to the informed sender voluntarily whenever she receives a message. We assume that
nothing in this model is contractible. Our results show that when the receiver places
greater importance on the project than the sender does, the receiver can obtain more
detailed information from the sender than that in the CS model. Further, there exists
an equilibrium whose outcome Pareto-dominates all the equilibrium outcomes in the
CS model. Moreover, we find an upper bound of the receiver’s equilibrium payo and
provide a sucient condition for it to be approximated by the receiver’s payo under
a certain equilibrium.
We comparemultistage information transmissionwith voluntarymonetary transfer
with optimal arbitration to investigate the most eective communication protocol for
the receiver. Surprisingly, when the communication round is high, the receiver may
obtain a higher ex ante expectedpayo than that under optimal arbitration underwhich
players benefit from the “formal contract” that forces them to commit themselves to
the predetermined decision rule.
Chapter 3 and 4 are closely connected to studies of cheap talk with a partially
informed receiver. In previous researches on the cheap talk model with an informed
receiver, the receiver automatically observes the signal about the state. In contrast,
we analyze the eect of the receiver’s strategic information acquisition on strategic
information transmission.9
In Chapter 3, we analyze a model where the receiver strategically gathers informa-
tion by conducting a costly investigation before communicating with the sender. The
receiver observes several signals that depend on both the state and her investigation
activity. In thismodel, by concentrating on a particular investigation activity so that the
sender is exposed to risk when he misrepresents his private information, the receiver
9In the model analyzed in Chapter 3, similar to the models in Moreno de Barreda (2013) and Ishida
and Shimizu (2016), the sender observes the state. In the model analyzed in Chapter 4, similar to models
in Watson (1996) and Ishida and Shimizu (2015), both the sender and the receiver are partially informed.
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can reduce the sender’s incentive to deceive her into choosing a desirable decision for
him. Moreover, the receiver’s strategic information acquisition can facilitate commu-
nication even when the precision of the signal is low. This result implies that the types
of investigation activities carried out by the receiver are important for communicating
eectively in contrast to the precision of the signals produced by each investigation
activity.
In the model in Chapter 4, the receiver chooses whether to conduct an investigation
and the timing of communication ( i.e., either before or after the investigation). We
find that (i) the receiver’s investigation facilitates communication and (ii) this depends
on the timing of communication, namely it could be important to elicit the informative
message that the timing of information transmission is before or after the investigation.
Our main finding is that under some conditions, the receiver can elicit the sender’s
private information by seeking advice after conducting the investigation, whereas she
cannot elicit it by seeking advice before the investigation.
2
Multistage Information Transmission with
Voluntary Monetary Transfer
2.1 Introduction
In the classic cheap talk model developed by Crawford and Sobel (1982), hereafter
CS, communication is unilateral and one-shot. More precisely, the informed expert
(sender) sends a message to the decision maker (receiver), who then chooses a project.
CS assume that the role of the receiver in the communication process is completely
passive. A number of situations are like this. In other situations, the receiver may
participate in the communication process actively, e.g., she may compensate the sender
for his messages.
In this chapter, we studymultistage communication as an extension of the CSmodel
and investigate how information transmission can be improved through the receiver’s
active participation in the communicationprocess. In particular, we focus onmultistage
information transmission with voluntary monetary transfer.
Our communication procedure diers from that of the CS model in two ways.
First, the sender can send messages to the receiver unilaterally more than once. We
assume that sending messages is costless1 and messages are unverifiable.2 Second, the
1Spence (1973) studies a signalingmodelwhere a informedparty conveys information by taking actions
that aect their own utility. In the framework of the CS model, Austen-Smith and Banks (2000), Kartik
(2007), and Karamychev and Visser (2016) show that information transmission can be improved when the
sender can send a costly message (burn money) to signal information. Relatedly, Kartik et al. (2007) and
Kartik (2009) study amendments to the CS model with other means of costly signals such as lying costs.
In this chapter, we focus on the receiver’s active participation in the communication process. Thus, we
assume that the sender cannot send a costly signal.
2SeidmannandWinter (1997) andMathis (2008) study the sender–receiver gamewhere themessage sent
by the sender is (partially) verifiable, namely the set of available messages depends on the sender’s type.
They provide the sucient conditions (the latter provides the necessary and sucient conditions) for the
existence of a fully revealing equilibrium. Forges and Koessler (2008) and Ho¨rner and Skrzypacz (2015)
study multistage sender–receiver games with certifiable messages (the long persuasion). The former
geometrically characterizes the set of equilibrium payos. The latter shows that the sequential revelation
of partially informative signals can increase payments to the sender who is trying to sell his information
to the receiver.
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receiver can pay money to the sender voluntarily whenever she receives a message
from the sender. More specifically, the receiver and sender engage in finite-period
communication before the former chooses a project. In each period, the sender sends
an unverifiablemessage to the receiver without cost, and then, the receiver paysmoney
to the sender voluntarily. After this finite-period communication, the receiver chooses
a project.
In this chapter, we show that when the receiver places greater importance on the
project than the sender does, (i) the receiver can obtain more detailed information from
the expert than in the CS model3 and (ii) there exists an equilibrium whose outcome
Pareto-dominates all the equilibrium outcomes in the CS model.
We also show that there exists no fully separating equilibrium in our model. This
finding implies that information transmission is limited in our communication pro-
cedure. By concentrating on the well-known uniform-quadratic model (i.e., with
quadratic preferences regarding the project and a uniform type distribution), we find
an upper bound of the receiver’s equilibrium payo and show that this can be approx-
imated by the receiver’s payo under a certain equilibrium when the communication
round is high.
Since we assume that messages are unverifiable, the receiver cannot write a con-
tract that specifies themonetary transfer depending on themessages sent by the sender.
When the receiver cannot write a contract and communication is one-shot, voluntary
monetary transfer does not aect information transmission. Moreover, allowing mul-
tiple rounds of unilateral (one-sided) communication in the CS model does not aect
the set of equilibria identified by the original model. For details, see Krishna and Mor-
gan (2004).4 We show that information transmission can be improved by combining
multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfer.
The intuition for why the receiver pays money to the sender under the equilibrium
in our model is as follows. In any cheap talk game, there always exists a completely
uninformative equilibrium (the babbling equilibrium). Therefore, if there is a partially
informative equilibrium, then there aremultiple equilibria. Thus, thedependence of the
selection of the future equilibrium on the receiver’s past payment creates an incentive
for the receiver to pay money to the sender. Similar to Benoit and Krishna (1985), we
use the multiple equilibria in the remaining (original) game to provide an incentive for
voluntary payments.
3This result means that there exists an equilibrium whose partition has a greater number of elements
than that achieved in any equilibrium in the CS model.
4Allowing multiple rounds of “bilateral” (face-to-face or two-sided) communication in the CS model
could result in equilibria that Pareto-dominate those of the original model. For more details, see Krishna
and Morgan (2004).
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Consider the situation where a (partially) informative equilibrium is played in the
future only when the receiver pays a certain amount of money to the sender in the
current period. Otherwise, play continues according to the babbling equilibrium. In
such a situation, the higher the receiver’s importance towards a project than towards
monetary transfer, the more she is willing to pay money in the current period to ensure
that the uninformative equilibrium would not be chosen in the future.
In our communication procedure, the sender sends a message while paying atten-
tion not only to the expected outcome from the project that would be implemented
in the future but also to the expected future monetary transfer. This fact means that
the possibility of the future monetary transfer aects the sender’s incentive regarding
sending a message in the current period, implying that the receiver can control the
sender’s incentive through voluntary monetary transfer to a certain degree.
The intuition for how the receiver controls the sender’s incentive through voluntary
monetary transfer is simple. In the CS model, given a state of the world, the most
desirable project for the sender always diers from that for the receiver. This factmeans
that in the CS model, excessively detailed information transmission is prevented since
the sender has an incentive to deceive the receiver into choosing a project that is more
desirable for him. By contrast, in our model, the receiver can weaken this cheating
incentive of the sender by paying money to him when he conveys some information
that is contrary to the bias.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the model.
Section 2.3 characterizes the equilibria. Section 2.4 derives the general properties of
these equilibria. Section 2.5 analyzes the uniform-quadratic model and shows the
benefits of multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfer. In
Section 2.5.1, we show two main results by constructing an equilibrium where infor-
mation is transmitted within two periods. In Section 2.5.2, we show the benefit of
long-term communication. In Section 2.5.3, we compare our communication proce-
dure with other communication protocols. In Section 2.6, we generalize players’ payo
functions and the prior probability distribution, and show two results that correspond
to the results in Section 2.5.1. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.1.1 Related Literature
CS study the one-shot unilateral communication game in which the sender sends a
costless and unverifiable message about his private information to the receiver, who
thenmakes a decision regarding the project that aects the payos of both parties. They
obtain a complete characterization of the set of equilibria in their model and show that
the existence of the incentive conflict prevents the full revelation of information. In
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this chapter, we investigate how information transmission can be improved under
multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfer.
Krishna and Morgan (2008) study an amendment to the CS model by allowing
the receiver to write a contract that specifies the monetary transfer depending on the
message sent by the sender. They show that full information revelation is feasible
but not optimal and they characterize the optimal contract. In their model, there is
a crucial assumption that the receiver can commit herself to compensate the sender
for his message. We show that in the situation where the communication round has
multiple periods, the receiver can control the sender’s incentive through voluntary
payment, although she cannot contract with the sender.
Our results are closely related to those of Krishna and Morgan (2004). Both their
study and our analysis in this chapter investigate how information transmission can
be improved through the receiver’s active participation in the communication process.
Krishna andMorgan (2004) add a long communication protocol to the CS model. They
show that if bilateral (face-to-face) communication between the receiver and sender
is possible before the sender sends a message about his private information to the
receiver, there exists an equilibrium whose outcome Pareto-dominates all the equilib-
rium outcomes in the CS model. The key factor to their results is that after the sender
conveys some information in the face-to-face communication, multiple equilibria exist
in the remaining game. The outcome of this face-to-face communication, which could
be random, determines which of these equilibria is played in the future. This fact
aects what the sender conveys during the face-to-face communication. Therefore,
in Krishna and Morgan (2004), the receiver tries to control the sender’s incentive by
controlling the degree of uncertainty associated with the outcome of the face-to-face
communication. By contrast, in our model, the receiver tries to control the sender’s
incentive directly through voluntarymonetary transfers. Moreover, there always exists
a completely uninformative (babbling) equilibrium in the CS model. Therefore, the re-
ceiver’s voluntarymonetary transfer is supported by a fear of the sender’s punishment
of babbling.
Noisy communication leads to improved information transmission (e.g., Krishna
and Morgan, 2004; Blume et al., 2007; Goltsman et al., 2009; Ivanov, 2010; Ambrus et
al., 2013).5 Blume et al. (2007) and Goltsman et al. (2009) characterize the optimal level
of noise (precisely, the latter characterize the optimal device, which they call “optimal
5Aumann and Hart (2003) study a finite simultaneous-move (long conversation) game in which there
are two players, with one player better informed than the other. They provide a complete geometrical
characterization of the set of equilibrium payos when the state of the world is finite and a long com-
munication is possible. In this study, state space and players’ action space must be finite. Therefore, we
cannot directly apply the results of this study to our model.
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mediation,” that controls the noise in communication) and provide a least upper bound
of the receiver’s equilibrium payo.
In Section 2.5.1, we compare our communication procedurewith optimalmediation
and show that when the receiver places greater importance on the project than the
sender does, the receiver can obtain a higher ex ante expected payo than that under
optimal noisy communication (mediation).
As shown by Dessein (2002), the receiver prefers delegation to communication as
long as the incentive conflict is not too large. In particular, in the uniform-quadratic
case of the CS model, the receiver always prefers delegation to communication even
when informative communication is feasible. This fact implies that it is important to in-
vestigate when the receiver should communicate with the sender instead of delegating
authority. Accordingly, we compare our communication procedure with delegation
and show that the receiver can obtain a higher ex ante expected payo than that un-
der delegation when the length of the communication round is high and the incentive
conflict is not too large.
In all the studies mentioned above, once the communication phase is over, the
receiver chooses a project. By contrast, in the previous studies wemention below, there
are multiple rounds of communication and actions. More precisely, in each period, the
sender sends a message and then the receiver chooses a project. Hence, the models are
dierent from ours. Golosov et al. (2014) study strategic information transmission in a
finitely repeated cheap talk game. Only the sender knows the state of the world, which
remains constant through out the game. They show that the sender can condition his
message on the receiver’s past actions; additionally, the receiver can choose actions
that reward the sender for following a path of messages that eventually leads to the
full revelation of information. By contrast, there is no fully revealing equilibrium in
our model. For truth telling to be incentive compatible, the resulting payment (i.e., the
sum of the monetary transfer that the sender receives) must be dierent for each state.
This point means that there must exist a on-the-path history where the receiver pays a
positive amount of money to the sender even though she would not obtain additional
information after this payment. At such a history, she has no incentive to pay money
to the sender. Therefore, there is no fully revealing equilibrium.
Kolotilin and Li (2016) investigate the optimal relational contracts in an infinitely
repeated cheap talk game. In contrast to our study, the sender’s private information
is not persistent in their model. Additionally, in each period, both the sender and the
receiver can pay money to each other. In their model, there are equilibria where the
sender always reveals his private information completely since he can send a costly
signal by paying money to the receiver. They show that full separation can be attained
in the equilibrium, whereas partial or complete pooling is optimal if preferences are
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divergent. Moreover, they allow the sender to pay money to the receiver. Therefore,
the optimal relational contract that maximizes social welfare in their model diers from
eective communication in our model.
2.2 Model
There are two players, a sender (S) and a receiver (R). R has the authority to choose
a project y 2 Y  R+, but the outcome produced by project y depends on S’s private
information, , which is distributed according to a dierentiable distribution function
G(), with density g(), over   [0; 1].
BeforeR chooses a project, R and S engage in T-period communication. Each period
consists of two-stage, stage 1 and stage 2. Stage 1 is the report stage, where S sends a
costless and unverifiable message to R. LetM  [0; 1] be S’s message space. We denote
by mt a message sent by S at stage 1 in period t. Stage 2 is the transfer stage, where R
voluntarily pays money to S. We denote by wt an amount of payment, which R pays to
S at stage 2 in period t. LetW  R+ be the set of the amount of payment possible for R.
After T-period communication, we proceed to period T + 1, where R chooses a project
and the game ends.
Let w be a sequence of transfers, w  (w1; : : : ;wT) 2 WT. We define R’s payo
function UR : Y  WT ! R as follows:
UR(y; ;w)  r  uR(y; )  
TX
t=1
wt
where r is a positive constantwhich represents a coecient of loss aversionwith respect
to a project she chose.
We define S’s payo function US : Y  WT ! R as follows:
US(y; ;w)  s  uS(y; ; b) +
TX
t=1
wt
where s is a positive constant which measures the relative importance between mone-
tary transfer and the utility from a project. Parameter b > 0 represents a “bias”, which
measures how much S’s interest diers from R’s.
Here, r  uR(y; ) and s  uS(y; ; b) denote utilities from project y for R and S, respec-
tively. We assume that for i 2 fR;Sg, the function ui is twice-continuously dierentiable
and satisfies assumptions that for each  and b, ui11 < 0 and u
i
12 > 0, and u
i
1 = 0 for
some y. Since ui1 = 0 for some y and u
i
11 < 0, for each given (; b) there exists a unique
maximizing project: yR() = argmaxy uR(y; ) and yS(; b) = argmaxy uS(y; ; b). We
assume that uR(y; )  uS(y; ; 0) and uS13 > 0 everywhere. Since uS13 > 0 and b > 0,
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we have yR() < yS(; b) for each . Constants r > 0 and s > 0 are scalar parameters.
The former measures how strongly R prefers the project, y = yR(), which is the most
desirable for R. The latter measures how strongly S prefers the project, y = yS(; b),
which is the most desirable for S.
PT
t=1wt is the sum of monetary transfers. In what
follows, we denote by  (b; s; r;T) our T-period communication game.
2.2.1 History and Strategies
A (public) history h(t; j) is defined to be a sequence of players’ past actions realized until
the beginning of the stage j in period t.
h(t; j) 
8>>><>>>:(m1;w1; : : : ;mt 1;wt 1) if j = 1,(m1;w1; : : : ;mt 1;wt 1;mt) if j = 2.
A (public) history hT+1 is defined to be a sequence of players’ past actions realized until
the beginning of the period T + 1, where R chooses a project.
hT+1  (m1;w1; : : : ;mT;wT):
Let H(t; j) and HT+1 be the set of h(t; j) and hT+1, respectively. We assume that H(1;1)
is a singleton set fg. Let us denote S’s private histories at stage 1 in period t by
h(t;1)

2  H(t;1)  H(t;1)

.
An S’s behavior strategy,  :
ST
t=1H
(t;1)

! M, specifies the probability distribution
of messages S’s type  sends at stage 1 in period t.6 Let (mtjh(t;1) ) be the probability
with which S sends mt at h
(t;1)

. An R’s pure strategy,  : fSTt=1H(t;2)g [ HT+1 ! W [ Y,
specifies the amount of payment she pays at stage 2 in the communication phase and
the project she chooses in period T + 1. Note that (h(t;2)) 2W, and (hT+1) 2 Y. Due to
the strict concavity of R’s preference over projects, she never mixes between projects in
period T + 1.
A belief system, f , maps fSTt=1H(t;2)g [HT+1 into the set of probability distributions
over. Let f (jh(t;2)) and f (jhT+1) be R’s beliefs about S’s type at history h(t;2) and hT+1,
respectively.
6Let B(M) be the Borel algebra on M. We restrict attention to a convenient class of  such that for
each M˜ 2 B(M), (M˜; ) : H(t;1)

! [0; 1] and (M˜; jh(t;1)) :  ! [0; 1] are measurable for all t 2 f1; : : : ;Tg,
respectively. This means that under given a probability measure on (H(t;1)

;B(H(t;1)

)), the prior probability
Pr(mt 2 M˜) and the posterior probability Pr(mt 2 M˜jh(t;1)) are uniquely induced.
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2.3 Equilibrium
LetH   M1 W1     MT WT  Y be the set of sequences of the realized state
and players’ actions, (;m1;w1; : : : ;mT;wT; y).7 Let B(H) be the Borel algebra on H.8
Given a strategy profile and a prior distribution, ((; );G), a probability measure P on
the measurable space (H;B(H)) is uniquely determined. For details, see Appendix 2.L.
Given h 2 H, the value of players’ payos, both UR and US, is uniquely derived.
Moreover, UR and US are measurable. Therefore, we can define the players’ ex ante
expected payos under ((; );G) as
R
h2HU
R(h)P(dh) and
R
h2HU
S(h)P(dh), respectively.
Fix an S’s private history at stage 1 in period t as h(t;1)

. We denote byVS(; jh(t;1)

;mt)
the S’s continuation payo after sending mt at h
(t;1)

. Fix a public history at stage 2 in
period t as h(t;2) and an R’s payment wt. Let VR((; ); f jh(t;2);wt) be R’s continuation
payo after paying wt at this history.
We shall analyze (weak) perfect Bayesian equilibria in  (b; s; r;T): both players’
strategies must maximize their expected payos after all histories, and the system of
beliefs f is derived from strategy profile (; ) through Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
Definition 2.1. A strategy profile (; ) and a belief system f constitute a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium if the following conditions hold. For any t 2 f1; : : : ;Tg,
1. for any h(t;1)

2 H(t;1)

and mt 2 suppf(jh(t;1) )g,
mt 2 argmax
m0t
VS(; jh(t;1)

;m0t);
2. for any h(t;2) 2 H(t;2),
(h(t;2)) 2 argmax
w0t
n
VR((; ); f jh(t;2);w0t)   w0t
o
;
3. for any hT+1 2 HT+1,
(hT+1) 2 argmax
y0
r
Z
uR(y0; ) f (djhT+1);
4. the belief system f is consistent with (; ).9
7In order to avoid confusion, we add a time operator to the players’ action space.
8Suppose that Rk and Rl are equipped with their Borel algebras B(Rk) and B(Rl), respectively, and let
Rk+l = Rk Rl. Then, B(Rk+l) = B(Rk) 
 (Rl). Hence, B(      Y)  B() 
 B(M1) 
    
 B(WT) 
 B(Y)
9Given h(t;2), the belief system induces a probability measure f (jh(t;2)) on (;B()). Since, moreover,
we assume that S’s behavior strategy (M˜; jh(t;2);wt) :  ! [0; 1] is measurable for any M˜ 2 B(Mt+1), we
can obtain a probability measure P(jh(t;2); (h(t;2))) on ( Mt+1;B() 
 B(Mt+1)). Therefore, we calculate
the posterior belief: for ˜ 2 B() and M˜ 2 B(Mt+1), if P(  M˜jh(t;2); (h(t;2))) > 0, then
f (˜jh(t;2); (h(t;2)); M˜) = P(˜  M˜jh
(t;2); (h(t;2)))
P(  M˜jh(t;2); (h(t;2))) :
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Hereafter, we call a perfect Bayesian equilibrium simply equilibrium. Suppose that
((; ); f ) be an equilibrium. At any payment stage history h(t;2), R does not obtain
additional information about S’s type from her own action wt. Therefore, we require
that at any h(t;2), any deviation by R from (h(t;2)) does not aect the beliefs she uses as
the basis for belief-updating.10
2.4 Some Properties of Equilibria
In what follows, we derive some properties of equilibria.
2.4.1 Relation to the CS Model
First, we discuss the relation between the equilibria in the CS model and those in
 (b; s; r;T). Since R cannot obtain additional information about  after stage 2 in period
T, she has no incentive to choose wT > 0. Therefore, wT must be equal to 0 in any
equilibrium. Consequently,  (b; s; r; 1) is contained in the CS model, and we call it
the model with one-shot information transmission. CS have shown that under one-shot
information transmission, for every b > 0, there exists a positive integer n˜(b) such
that, for every n 2 f1; : : : ; n˜(b)g, there exists an equilibrium with a n-element partition,
f[an; an 1); [an 1; an 2); : : : [a1; a0]g. Under this equilibrium, S’s type  2 [ai+1; ai) reports
that his type belongs to this interval, and after receiving the message that “ belongs to
[ai+1; ai)”, R chooses the project y(ai+1; ai)  argmaxy
R ai
ai+1
uR(y; )g()d. By convention,
we define y(a1; a0) = y(a0) if a1 = a0. Since uR is strictly concave, y(ai+1; ai) is uniquely
determined. Moreover, since uR12 > 0, y(ai+1; ai) is strictly increasing in both of its
arguments. Therefore, it must be satisfied that: for i = 1; : : : ;n   1;
s  uS(y(ai+1; ai); ai; b)   s  uS(y(ai; ai 1); ai; b) = 0; (2.1)
an = 0; (2.2)
a0 = 1: (2.3)
We shall call a sequence a  fa0; : : : ; ang is a (backward) solution of (2.1) if a satisfies
(2.1)–(2.3). We shall impose the followingmonotonicity condition on a solution of (2.1).
Condition M . If a0 and a00 are two solutions of (2.1) with a00 = a
00
0 and a
0
1 > a
00
1 , then
a0i  a00i for all i  2.
10We require that for anywt 2Wt, ifP(M˜jh(t;2);wt) =
R
2suppf f (jh(t;2))g (M˜j; h(t;2);wt) f (djh(t;2)) > 0, then
f (˜jh(t;2);wt; M˜) = P(˜  M˜jh
(t;2);wt)
P(  M˜jh(t;2);wt) ;
where P(˜  M˜jh(t;2);wt) =
R
2˜\suppf f (jh(t;2))g (M˜j; h(t;2);wt) f (djh(t;2)).
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This condition is met by the uniform-quadratic case: s  uS(y; ; b)   s(y  (+ b))2,
r  uR(y; )   r(y   )2, and G() is uniform distribution over [0; 1]. CS have shown
that Condition M also holds for more general specifications.
Suppose a strategy profile under which S sends an informative message only at
stage 1 in period 1, and R pays nothing to S at any payment stage. Obviously, if both
S’s behavior regarding sendingm1 andR’s behavior regarding choosing ydepending on
m1 are the same as an equilibrium in the CSmodel, then this strategy profile constitutes
an equilibrium in  (b; s; r;T). Therefore, we immediately have the following Fact 2.1.
Fact 2.1. Any equilibrium partition achieved in the CS model can be achieved under an equi-
librium in  (b; s; r;T).
2.4.2 Relation to Direct Contract
In this section, we first characterize the relation between equilibria in  (b; s; r;T) and
those in a case where R can write a contract that specifies the transfer as functions of
messages sent by S.
Fix an equilibrium  = ((; ); f ). Let  :  ! (MT) be a probability distribution
induced by (; ) overMT. When a sequence ofmessagesm 2MT is given, a sequence of
payments w 2WT and a project y are induced from , respectively. Let ! : MT !WT
and y : MT ! Y be the functions induced by , respectively.
Now, consider the case where R can contract ! with S. By the construction of
! : MT ! WT, under this indirect contract (MT; !), the strategy profile (; y)
constitutes an perfect Bayesian equilibrium that is outcome equivalent to  in the sense
that both of this equilibrium and  induce the same probability distribution overWTY
for any .
Next,wediscuss the relationbetween equilibria under this indirect contract (MT; !)
and those under a direct contract whereR canwrite a contract that specifies the transfer
as functions of the direct messagem 2  sent by S. Let (; !) be a direct contract under
which S reports 2  andR pays!() for S. Let y : ! Y be theR’s strategy under the
direct contract (; !). By the application of the result of Krishna and Morgan (2008),11
we immediately have the following Fact 2.2.
Fact 2.2. Consider an equilibrium under (MT; !). There exists a direct contract (; !)
under which there exists a pure strategy equilibrium which is outcome equivalent to the given
equilibrium under (MT; !).
Finally, we characterize the relation between equilibria in  (b; s; r;T) and those
under a direct contract (; !). The following Proposition 2.1 shows that given an
11For details, see Proposition 2 in Krishna and Morgan (2008).
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equilibrium  in  (b; s; r;T), there exists an equilibrium of a direct contract which is
outcome equivalent in the sense that it results in the same projects and transfer as in
the original equilibrium for almost every state.
Proposition 2.1. Fix an equilibrium  in  (b; s; r;T). There exists a direct contract (; !)
under which there exists a pure strategy equilibrium which is outcome equivalent to .
In the indirect contract cases, !(m) specifies a sequence of payments, w1(m); : : : ;
wT(m)), dependently on m. In the direct contract case, !() specifies the resulting
transfer dependently on . Fact 2.2 shows that for almost every  and for anym; m0 2
supp(j), it must be satisfied that PTt=1wt(m) = PTt=1wt(m0) = !() and the induced
projects is same, y(m) = y(m0) = y(). This means that there exists a direct contract
(; !) underwhich there exists a pure strategy equilibriumwhich is outcome equivalent
to any equilibrium in  (b; s; r;T).
2.4.3 Partition Equilibrium
As is the case in the CS model, all the equilibria in  (b; s; r;T) are interval partitional,
that is, all the equilibria are partition equilibria.
Definition 2.2 (Partition Equilibrium). Fix an equilibrium  in  (b; s; r;T). Consider a
pure strategy equilibrium, under a direct contract (; !), which is outcome equivalent
to . If there exists a family of sets fIg2 over  such that
1. fIg2 constitutes an interval partition12 over ,
2. y() = y(0) for all , 0 2 I,
3. if  , 0, then y() , y(0) for all  2 I and 0 2 I0 , then
we call  partition equilibrium, and fIg2 equilibrium partition.
We show the following Proposition 2.2.
Proposition 2.2. Any equilibrium under a direct contract (; !) is partition equilibrium.
The proof of Proposition 2.2 can be found in Appendix 2.A. The above Proposi-
tion 2.1 implies that any equilibrium outcome in  (b; s; r;T) is also achieved in equilib-
rium under a corresponding direct contract. Therefore, Proposition 2.2 means that all
equilibria in  (b; s; r;T) are partition equilibria. The following Proposition 2.3 shows
that there is no fully separating equilibria in  (b; s; r;T).
12For all  , 0, I \ I0 = ;. For all  2 , I is convex, andS2 I = .
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Proposition 2.3. There exists no fully separating equilibrium in  (b; s; r;T).
The proof of Proposition 2.3 can be found in Appendix 2.B. In Krishna and Morgan
(2008), R can commit herself to compensating for S’s message. Therefore, fully separat-
ing equilibria (full revelation contracts) are always feasible in their model. By contrast,
in our model, since R cannot commit herself to compensating for S’s message, she pays
money to S only when paying money is optimal for her. For truth telling to be incen-
tive compatible, it must be satisfied that the resulting sum of monetary transfer that S
receives is dierent for each  2 . This means that R reaches surely a history where
she pays a certain amount of money to S even though she does not obtain additional
information in the future. Therefore, R has no incentive to pay money to S at such a
history. This is the reason why there exists no fully separating equilibrium.
2.5 The Uniform-quadratic Case
As noted earlier, it is hard to obtain the full characterization of equilibria. In what fol-
lows, we take a small step in that direction, concentrating on the well-known uniform-
quadratic case: r  uR(y; ) =  r(y   )2, s  uS(y; ; b) =  s(y   ( + b))2, and G() is a
uniform distribution over .
2.5.1 Two-period Information Elicitation
As a starting point, we construct an equilibrium where information is transmitted
within two period and R pays a positive amount of money to S on the equilibrium
path. By constructing such an equilibrium, we show two results. One is that if T  2
and r is large relative to s,R can obtainmore detailed information in ourmodel than that
in a model with one-shot information transmission. The other is that if T  2 and r is
large relative to s, there exists an equilibriumwhose outcome ex ante Pareto-dominates
all the equilibrium outcomes in a model with one-shot information transmission. In
Section 6, we show these two results under more general setting.
To simplify the analysis, we suppose that b 2 (1=12; 1=4). Then, there are two
equilibria in amodelwith one-shot information transmission. One is the uninformative
equilibrium: a0 = 1 and a1 = 0. The other is a partially informative equilibrium:
a0 = 1, a1 = 1=2   2b and a2 = 0. CS have shown that both S and R prefer the
partially informative equilibrium to the uninformative equilibrium. Under the partially
informative equilibrium, the ex ante expected payo of R is  r(1=48 + b2) whereas the
ex ante expected payo of S is  s(1=48 + b2)   sb2.
Now, we show the following Proposition 2.4 which establishes that in multistage
information transmission with voluntary monetary transfer, there exists an equilib-
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rium whose partition has more steps than that in a model with one-shot information
transmission.
Proposition 2.4. Fix b 2 (1=12; 1=4). If s=r < (1   4b)=(1 + 12b), then there exists a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium with a 3-element partition.
Proof of Proposition 2.4. To prove this Proposition, we construct a 3-element partition
equilibrium under which S conveys  < a1 or not in period 1. After conveying  < a1,
then S conveys in period 2 whether  belongs to [0; a2) or [a2; a1).
More precisely, we consider a strategy profile under which the information is trans-
mitted in the following steps. At stage 1 in period 1, S of type  < a1 sends a message
m1 randomly according to a uniform distribution over [0; a1), and S of type   a1 sends
a message m1 randomly according to a uniform distribution over [a1; 1]. If R receives
m1 < a1 at stage 1 in period 1, then she pays w1 = w to S. Otherwise, she pays nothing
to S at stage 2 inperiod 1. At stage 1 in period 2, if m1 < a1 and w1  w, then S of type
 < a2 sends a message m2 randomly according to a uniform distribution over [0; a2),
and S of type   a2 sends a messagem2 randomly according to a uniform distribution
over [a2; 1]. Otherwise, any type of S sends a message m2 randomly according to a
uniform distribution over [0; 1]. In period t  2 R pays nothing to S. In period t  3, S
always sends babbling message.
Under the above strategy profile, R eventually learns whether  belongs to [0; a2),
[a2; a1), [a1; 1] or [0; a1)g. Note that [0; a1) is the support of R’s belief at o-the-path h3:
m1 < a1, w1 < w and m2 2 [0; 1].
At hT+1 where m1  a1, since R believes  is uniformly distributed over [a1; 1],
optimal project forR is y1 = (a1+1)=2. At hT+1 wherem1 < a1,w1  w, andm2  a2, since
R believes is uniformly distributed over [a2; a1), optimal project forR is y2 = (a2+a1)=2.
At hT+1 wherem1 < a1, w1  w, andm2 < a2, since R believes  is uniformly distributed
over [0; a2), optimal project for R is y3 = a2=2. At hT+1 where m1 < a1 and w1 < w, since
R believes  is uniformly distributed over [0; a1), optimal project for R is y˜ = a1=2.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the equilibriumstrategy. In period t  2,R alwayspays nothing
to S. This implies that the partition f[0; a2); [a2; a1)g must coincide with the 2-element
equilibrium partition achieved in a model with one shot information transmission
where  is drawn from the uniform distribution over [0; a1). By Crawford and Sobel, it
must be satisfied that
a2 = a1=2   2b: (2.4)
Since we now construct a 3-element partition equilibrium where 0 < a2 < a1 < 1, it
must be satisfied that a2 > 0. Hence, it must be satisfied that a1 > 4b.
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Figure 2.1: Equilibrium Strategy
The key of our idea is that information elicitation is divided into two steps. After
receiving the message m1 < a1 in period 1, there are two “cheap talk” equilibria in the
remaining game. One is the completely uninformative equilibrium, that is, babbling
equilibrium whose partition is f[0; a1)g. The other is partially informative equilibrium,
that is, 2-element partition equilibrium whose partition is f[0; a2); [a2; a1)g. After receiving
the message m1 < a1, R pays w1 = w to S so that the babbling equilibrium would not
be chosen in period 2. Furthermore, this R’s “message contingent payment” has an
impact on S’s incentive.
In what follows, wemake sure that by taking a1, a2 andw suitably, we can constitute
an equilibrium where S and R follow the above strategy profile. Under the above
strategy profile, S of type  2 (ai; ai 1) sends messages so that yi would be chosen by R.
Hence, the payo of S’s type  2 (ai; ai 1) is derived as follows:
  s(y3   ( + b))2 + w for  2 [0; a2);
  s(y2   ( + b))2 + w for  2 [a2; a1);
  s(y1   ( + b))2 for  2 [a1; 1].
Since we suppose that a2 = a1=2   2b, we have
  s(y3   ( + b))2 >  s(y2   ( + b))2 for  2 [0; a2);
  s(y3   ( + b))2 <  s(y2   ( + b))2 for  2 (a2; 1];
  s(y3   ( + b))2 =  s(y2   ( + b))2 for  = a2.
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This implies that at stage 1 in period 2 wherem1 < a1 and w1  w, S has no incentive to
deviate from given strategy.
At stage 1 in period 2 where m1 < a1 and w1 < w, and at stage 1 in period 2 where
m1  a1, S always sends a babbling message. Therefore, S has no incentive to deviate
at such a history. The same can be said in period t  3. Hence, we can conclude that S
has no incentive to deviate in period t  2 when a2 = a1=2   2b.
At stage 1 in period 1, if S of type  sends m1  a1, then he obtains  s(y1   (+ b))2.
Otherwise, S of type   a2 obtains  s(y2   ( + b))2 + w, and S of type  < a2 obtains
 s(y3   ( + b))2 + w. If it is satisfied that
 s(y1   (a1 + b))2 =  s(y2   (a1 + b))2 + w; then (2.5)
 s(y1   ( + b))2  max
j2f1;2g
f s(y j+1   ( + b))2 + wg for   a1; (2.6)
 s(y j+1   ( + b))2 + w >  s(y1   ( + b))2 for i  1 and  2 [aˆi+1; aˆi). (2.7)
When (2.6) and (2.7) hold, S has no incentive to a deviation at stage 1 in period 1. The
following Figure 2.2 illustrates (2.6) and (2.7).
-
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0
US(y; ; bjy)
a2y3
6
?
w1
a1
y2
6
?
w1
1y1
Blue curve: s  uS(y3; ; b) + w1
Red curve: s  uS(y2; ; b) + w1
Black curve: s  uS(y1; ; b)
Figure 2.2: The sender’s payo on the equilibrium path
By the equation (2.5), we have
w = w(a1)  s[3(1=2 + b   a1=4)(a1=4 + b   3=2)]: (2.8)
Since w(a1) is strictly increasing in a1 2 [4b; 1], we have an inverse function of w()
such that w 1(w)  a1(w) is strictly increasing in w 2 [w(4b);w(1)]. Since, moreover,
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we suppose that b 2 (1=12; 1=4), it is satisfied that w(4b) = s(12b   1)=4 > 0. Note that
a1(w) = 23
n
2   p(1 + 6b)2   12w=so and a1(w) 2 (4b; 1) when w 2 (w(4b);w(1)).
Summarizing the above, we can conclude that S has no incentive to a deviation
when boundaries of partition satisfy the following conditions:
ai(w) 
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
1 for i = 0;
2
3
n
2   p(1 + 6b)2   12w=so for i = 1;
1
3
n
2   p(1 + 6b)2   12w=so   2b for i = 2;
0 for i = 3:
(2.9)
where w 2 (w(4b);w(1)).
At any h(t;2), R has no incentive to increase the amount of payment because that
does not aect S’s behavior. Therefore, we have only to make sure that paying w is
optimal for R at stage 2 in period 1 where m1 < a1.
At stage 2 in period 1 where m1 < a1, if R pays w1  w, then she obtains u(w1):
u(w1) =  w1   1a1
2X
i=1
Z ai
ai+1
r
ai+1 + ai
2
  
2
d
=  w1   r12a1
2X
i=1
(ai   ai+1)3
=  w1   r12a1 (a
3
2 + (a1   a2)3):
Clearly, u(w1) takes the maximum value u at w1 = w.
On the other hand, by paying w1 < w at stage 2 in period 1 where m1 < a1, she
obtains u(w1):
u(w1) =  w1 +
Z a1
0
1
a1
UR
a1
2
; 

d
=  w1   ra1
Z a1
0
a1
2
  
2
d
=  w1  
a21
12
r :
Clearly, u(w1) takes the maximum value u at w1 = 0. Therefore, paying w is an optimal
decision for R if and only if u  u. Using condition (2.9), we have
u  u () r
 fa1(w)g2
16
  b2
!
 w: (2.10)
Since a1(w)  23
n
2   p(1 + 6b)2   12w=so, for any w 2 (w(4b);w(1))
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 a1(w) is strictly increasing in w;
 fa1(w)g216   b2 > 0 and fa1(w(4b))g
2
16   b2 = 0;
 d2
dw2
fa1(w)g2 > 0.
Hence, if r(fa1(w(1))g2=16   b2) > w(1), then there exists w 2 (w(4b);w(1)) such that for
all w 2 [w;w(1)), the inequality (2.10) holds.
Since a1(w(1)) = 1 and w(1) = s(1+ 12b)(3+ 12b)=48, the inequality r(fa1(w(1))g2=16 
b2) > w(1) can be simplified into
s
r
<
1   4b
1 + 12b
:
Summarizing the above, we can conclude that if s=r < (1   4b)=(1 + 12b), then
the strategy profile and the system of beliefs that we construct above constitute an
equilibriumwhenw 2 [w;w(1)) and boundaries of partition satisfies the condition (2.9).

Remark 2.1. In any equilibrium where R pays positive amount of money to S on the
equilibriumpath, meaningful information transmissionmust occur afterR paysmoney
to S. Therefore, there must exist a partially informative equilibrium after R pays w to
S. If it is not so, messages sent by S in period 2 are completely noninformative.
Consequently, R has no incentive to pay money to S in period 1. For this reason, in
Proposition 2.4, we require that b < 1=4.
We can consider a possibility of the existence of a 3-element partition equilibrium
where S reveals the interval in a dierent order. Specifically, consider the following
strategy profile. In period 1, S conveys   a2 or not. If S conveys   a2, then R pays
w˜, and then, S conveys  < a1 or not. Note that a2 < a1. The following Proposition 2.5
shows that there is no equilibrium where information is transmitted in such a way.
Proposition 2.5. Fix b 2 (1=12; 1=4). Then, there exists no 3-element partition equilibrium
where information is transmitted in the following steps. First, S conveys that  belongs
to which element of f[0; a2); [a2; 1]g. Second, S conveys that  belongs to which element of
f[a2; a1); [a1; 1]g.
Proof of Proposition 2.5. For S’s incentive compatibility in period 2, the partition
f[a2; a1); [a1; 1]g must be coincide with the 2-element equilibrium partition achieved
in a model with one shot information transmission where  is drawn from the uniform
distribution over [0; a1). ByCrawford and Sobel, itmust be satisfied that 1 = 2a1 a2+4b.
This equation can be simplified into
1   a1 = a1   a2 + 4b: (2.11)
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Moreover, similar to the condition (2.5), the indierence condition for S of type
 = a2 induces the following condition:
w˜ = sf(a2 + a1)=2   (a2 + b)g2   s(a2=2   (a2 + b))2:
The value of w˜ is positive if and only if a1   a2 > a2 + 4b. This means that a1   a2 > 4b.
Hence, we have
(a2   0) + (a1   a2) + (1   a1) = 2(a1   a2) + 4b + a2
> 12b + 3a2:
Sincewe now suppose that b 2 (1=12; 1=4), we have 12b+3a2 > 1. Therefore, boundaries
of the partition and the payment w˜ is not well defined. This implies that we cannot
construct a 3-element partition equilibrium under which R learns  < a2 or not in
period 1, and after learning   a2 in period 1, then R learns in period 2 whether 
belongs to [a2; a1) or [a1; 1]. 
It can be confirmed that if r is large relative to s, R can obtain greater ex ante expected
revenue from the project in a 3-element partition equilibrium than that in 2-element
partition equilibrium where the communication is one-shot. For details, see the proof
of the following Lemma 1. This implies that R can obtain more valuable information
about S’s type through multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary
transfer. However, it is not true that multistage information transmission with volun-
tarymonetary transfer is always beneficial toR since she has to paymoney to S in order
to obtain valuable information.
We now show the second result that when r is large relative to s, multistage infor-
mation transmission with voluntary monetary transfer is more beneficial to both R and
S than one-shot information transmission.
Proposition 2.6. Fix b 2 (1=12; 1=4). Then there exists a positive value (b) such that
if sr < 
(b), there exists a 3-element partition equilibrium whose outcome ex ante Pareto-
dominates all the equilibrium outcomes in the model with one-shot information transmission.
Suppose that s=r < (1   4b)=(1 + 12b). Fix a 3-element partition equilibrium con-
structed in the proof of Proposition 2.4. We prove Proposition 2.6 by two steps. First,
we show that if r is large relative to s, there exists a 3-element partition equilibrium
which R prefers to all the equilibria without monetary transfer.
CS have shown that for given b, in a model with one-shot information transmission,
R always strictly prefers 2-element partition equilibrium to the babbling equilibrium.
Let f[a˜2; a˜1)[a˜1; a˜0] be the partition of 2-element partition equilibrium in a model with
2.5. The Uniform-quadratic Case 27
one-shot information transmission. We denote by EUˆR the ex ante expected payo of
R under this equilibrium. We have
EUˆR =  
2X
i=1
Z a˜i 1
a˜i
r
 a˜i 1 + a˜i
2
  
2
d
=   r
48
  rb2:
Wedenote by EU
R
(a1) the ex ante expected payo ofR under the 3-element partition
equilibrium with a1 2 (a; 1) where a  a1(w).
By the definition of a1(w), we have
w(x)  a 11 (x) = s[3(1=2 + b   x=4)(x=4 + b   3=2)]: for x 2 [a; 1).
In what follows, we denote by s  (b; x) the function w(x).
The ex ante expected payo of R under 3-element partition equilibrium where
a1 = x 2 (a; 1) is
EU
R
(x) =  
3X
i=1
Z ai 1(x)
ai(x)
r
"
ai 1(x) + ai(x)
2
  
#2
d   xs  (b; x)
=  r
(
x3
48
+ xb2
)
  r
12
(1   x)3   xs  (b; x):
We show the following Lemma 2.1.
Lemma 2.1. There exists a positive value (b) such that if s=r < (b), there exists x; x 2 (a; 1)
such that
EU
R
(x) > EUˆR and EU
R
(x) < EUˆR:
Proof of Lemma 2.1. Let (x; s; r)  1r fEU
R
(x)   EUˆRg. We have
(x; s; r) =   1
16
(1   x3) + x
4
(1   x) + b2(1   x)   s
r
x(b; x):
It holds that (x; s; r) < 0, if and only if
(b; x)   
1
16 (1   x3) + x4 (1   x) + b2(1   x)
x(b; x)
<
s
r
:
Since @@x jx=1(b; x) < 0 and (b; 1) = 0, there exists "ˆ > 0 such that (b; x) < s=r for all
x 2 (1   "ˆ; 1).
It holds that (x; s; r) > 0, if and only if
(b; x) > s
r
:
Since infx2(a;1) x(b; x) > 0, (b; x) has a least upper bound (b) = supx2(a;1) (b; x) > 0.
Therefore, if s=r < (b), there exists x such that x 2 (a; 1) and (x) > 0. This completes
the proof of Lemma 1. 
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Remark 2.2. When x almost equal to 1, boundaries of the 3-element partition equi-
librium almost coincides with boundaries of the 2-element partition equilibrium in a
modelwith one-shot information transmission. Nevertheless, the payment ofmonetary
transfer a 11 (x) is high (almost coincides with w(1)). Therefore, if s=r < (1  4b)=(1+ 12b),
there always exists a 3-element partition equilibrium which is unfavorable to R. More-
over, since w goes to w(1) as s=r goes to (1   4b)=(1 + 12b), a goes to 1 as s=r goes to
(1   4b)=(1 + 12b). Hence, (b) is always less than (1   4b)=(1 + 12b).
Hereafter, we complete the proof of Proposition 2.6 . CS have shown that for given
b, in a model with one-shot information transmission, S always strictly prefers ex ante
2-element partition equilibrium to the babbling equilibrium. We denote by EUˆS the ex
ante expected payo of S under the 2-element partition equilibrium in a model with
one-shot information transmission. We have
EUˆS =  
2X
i=1
Z a˜i 1
a˜i
s
 a˜i 1 + a˜i
2
  
2
d   sb2
=
s
r
EUˆR   sb2:
We denote by EUS(x) the ex ante expected payo of S under the 3-element partition
equilibrium with a1 = x 2 (a; 1).
EU
S
(x) =  
3X
i=1
Z ai 1(x)
ai(x)
s
"
ai 1(x) + ai(x)
2
  
#2
d   sb2 + x  w(x)
=
s
r

EU
R
(x) + x  w(x)

  sb2 + x  w(x):
Clearly, if EU
R
(x) > EUˆR, then EU
S
(x) > EUˆS. Therefore, if s=r < (b), there exists
x 2 (a; 1) such that
EU
R
(x) > EUˆR and EU
S
(x) > EUˆS:
This completes the proof of Proposition 2.6.
It is well known that the existence of non-strategic mediator leads to improved infor-
mation transmission. Now, we compare our communication procedure with optimal
mediation. In mediation model S can send a message to an impartial mediator, who
then passes on a recommendation to R according to some predetermined rule. Golts-
man et al. (2009) have characterized the optimal mediation where R’s ex ante expected
payo is   r3b(1  b). The following Proposition 2.7 shows that under 2-period informa-
tion elicitation with voluntary monetary transfer, R can obtain higher ex ante expected
payo than that under optimal mediation model.
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Proposition 2.7. Fix b 2 (1=12; f4+p3g=26).13 Then there exists 0(b) such that if s=r < 0(b),
for some x 2 (a; 1);
EU
R
(x) >   r
3
b(1   b):
Since this proposition can be proved in the same way as the proof of Lemma 2.1,
the formal proof is omitted. When b is almost equal to 1=4, boundaries of the 3-
element partition equilibrium almost coincides with those of the 2-element partition
equilibrium in the CS model. The value of   r3b(1   b) is always strictly higher than
the R’s equilibrium payo under the 2-element partition equilibrium in the CS model.
Therefore, Proposition 2.7 requires that b < (4 +
p
3)=26 < 1=4.
2.5.2 Effective T-period Communication
Under the equilibrium that we construct in previous Section 2.5.1, information is trans-
mitted within only two periods, the first period and the second period, regardless of
the length of communication. It seems that R does not use T-period communication
eectively. In Section 2.5.2, we show the benefit of long term communication.
First, we provide some properties of equilibrium outcomes. The following Propo-
sition 2.8 shows that all the equilibria in  (b; s; r;T) are finite partition equilibria.
Proposition 2.8. In the uniform-quadratic case, all the equilibria in  (b; s; r;T) are finite
partition equilibria.
The proof of Proposition 2.8 can be found in Appendix 2.C. Second, we provide an
upper bound of R’s equilibrium payo. The following Proposition 2.9 establishes an
upper bound14 of R’s equilibrium payo.
Proposition 2.9. In the uniform-quadratic case, the upper bound of R’s equilibrium payo is
given by  16rb3=3.
The proof of Proposition 2.9 can be found in Appendix 2.D. One of the main find-
ings in our analysis is that under some conditions, this upper bound  16rb3=3 can be
approximated byR’s payo under a finite partition equilibriumwhen T is long enough.
For the details of this result, see Proposition 2.11.
Next, we demonstrate that under a certain condition, there exists an equilibrium
underwhich information is transmittedwithin thewhole T periods. More precisely, we
consider the following information elicitation. In period 1, R learns whether the value
of  is less than a1. If R learns that the value of  is less than a1, then she pays a certain
13Note that 15 <
1
26

4 +
p
3

< 14 .
14This upper bound is not necessarily the least upper bound.
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amount ofmoney to S. After that, in period 2,R learnswhether the value of is less than
a2. IfR learns that the value of  is less than a2, then she pays a certain amount ofmoney
to S. This information elicitation is repeated until the last period in the communication
round. In the last period in the communication round, R learns whether the value
of  is less than aT. Under this communication process, R eventually learns to which
element of a partition f[ai+1; ai)gTi=1 [ [a1; a0] the state  belongs. In what follows, we call
this communication process (monotone) eective T-period communication.15

0
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1
a0a1
?w1 > 0
--
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0
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1
a0a1a2
--
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1
a0a1a2at 1at
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Figure 2.3: Information elicitation under monotone eective T-period communication
Proposition 2.10. Fix b 2 (0; 1=4). If s=r < (1   4b)=(1 + 12b), there exists an equilibrium
with eective T-period communication.
To prove Proposition 2.10, we construct a (T + 1)-element partition equilibrium
with eective T-period communication. Under this equilibrium, the information is
transmitted in the following steps. At h(t;1) in which mt0 < at0 and wt0  wt0 for
all t0 < t, S of type  < at sends a message mt randomly according to a uniform
distribution over [0; at), and S of type   at sends a message mt randomly according
to a uniform distribution over [at; 1]. Otherwise, any type of S sends a message mt
randomly according to a uniform distribution over [0; 1]. If R learns  < at at stage 1 in
period t, then he pays wt to S. Otherwise, he pays nothing to S at stage 2.
Under the above communication procedure, for any hT+1, the closure of f 2  :
f (jhT+1) > 0g, I(hT+1), belongs to f[ai+1; ai]gTi=0 [ f[aT+1; ai]gT 1i=0 , and R believes that  is
uniformly distributed over I(hT+1). Therefore, Rmust choose y = min I(h
T+1)+max I(hT+1)
2 at
hT+1.
15This Information elicitation is similar to those in Ivanov (2015) and Ho¨rner and Skrzypacz (2015)
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At hT in which mt0 < at0 and wt0  wt0 for all t0 < T, since R does not obtain
additional information in the future, wT must be equal to 0. Therefore, f[ai+1; ai)gTi=T 1
must coincide with the 2-element equilibrium partition achieved in a model with one
shot information transmission where  = [0; aT 1). By Crawford and Sobel, it must be
satisfied that
aT =
aT 1
2
  2b:
This implies that aT 1 > 4b. We define at and wt as follows:
ai 
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1   ia for i 2 f0; : : : ;T   1g;
1 (T 1)a
2   2b for i = T;
0 for i = T + 1:
wt 
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
2bsa for t 2 f0; : : : ;T   2g;
s
16 f1 + 12b   a(T + 1)gf1 + 4b   a(T   3)g for t = T   1;
0 for t = T:
Note that 0 = aT+1 < aT < aT 1 <    < a0 = 1 and 4b < aT 1 if and only if
a < (1   4b)=(T   1), and wT 1 > 0 if a < minf(1 + 12b)=(T + 1); (1 + 4b)=(T   3)g. Since
we suppose that T  3, we have (1 + 4b)=(T   3) > (1   4b)=(T   1). Therefore, if
a < minf(1  4b)=(T  1); (1+ 12b)=(T+ 1)g, ai and wt are well-defined. Moreover, for any
t 2 f1; : : : ;T   1g, wt becomes a solution to an equation,
s
at + at 1
2
  (at + b)
2
=  s
at+1 + at
2
  (at + b)
2
+ wt ;
inducedbya conditionwhich requires thatS’s typeswho fall on theboundaries between
adjacent intervals are indierent between the associated values of y.
The strategy profile and system of beliefs outlined above, which we denote by T,
can not always be an equilibrium. It depends on the value of a. We show that T
can be an equilibrium by taking a small enough. When a  0, R’s payment wt in each
t  T   2 goes 0. Consider a history at stage 2 in period T   1 where mt < at for
all t  T   1. At such a history, there are two cheap talk equilibria in the remaining
game; the babbling equilibrium and the 2-element partition equilibrium. Since we
now suppose that a  0, if the 2-element partition equilibrium is chosen in period T,
R’s continuation payo is approximated by  r(b2   1=48). Otherwise, R’s continuation
payo is approximated by  r=12. Moreover, wT 1  s(1 + 12b)(1 + 4b)=16. Since we
suppose that s=r < (1   4b)=(1 + 12b), we have
 r

b2   1
48

 

  r
12

>
s
16
(1 + 12b)(1 + 4b):
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Thus, R has incentive to paywT 1 at this history so that the babbling equilibriumwould
not be chosen in next period. The formal proof can be found in Appendix 2.E.
In Proposition 2.10, we have only shown the possibility of the eective T-period
communication. In order for T to be an equilibrium, it might be required that aT 1 is
close to 1. If aT 1 is close to 1, R faces with the history h(T;1) in which I(h(T;1)) = [0; aT 1]
with a high probability on the equilibrium path. Moreover, f[ai+1; ai)Ti=T 1g almost
coincides with the 2-element equilibrium partition achieved in a model with one-shot
information transmission. In such a case, the initial (T 1)-period communication does
not have much meaning for R ex ante. Now, we show that the benefit of long therm
communication.
Proposition 2.11. Fix b 2 (0; 1=4) and r > 0. For any d > 0, there exists T(b; d; r) such that
if T  T(b; d; r), there exists (b;T; d; r) such that if s < (b;T; d; r), R can obtain the higher ex
ante expected payo than  16rb3=3   d.
The formal proof can be found in Appendix 2.F. We have already shown that an
upper bound of R’s equilibrium payo is  16rb3=3. This Proposition 2.11 shows that
if the length of the communication round is suciently high and R places greater
importance on the project than S does, then this upper bound can be approximated by
an R’s equilibrium payo.
Remark 2.3. Suppose that " constitutes an equilibrium of  (b; s; r;T) where R obtains
EUR(") >  16rb3=3   d. Consider  (b; s; r;T0) where T0 > T. Now, construct a strategy
profile 0" bymodifying ". In particular, under 0", players follow " until period T, and
then S always sends babbling massage and R never pays money to S in the future. It is
obvious that 0" constitutes an equilibrium of  (b; s; r;T0) and R’s equilibrium payo is
equal to EUR(") >  16rb3=3   d.
2.5.3 Comparison with Other Communication Protocols
Now, we compare the eective T-period communication with other communication
protocols, i.e. delegation, arbitration and mediation, that strictly dominate the one-
shot information transmission: that is, under these communication protocols, R can
obtain the higher ex ante expected payo than that under the one-shot information
transmission.
When R delegates control, her payo is given by  rb2. As shown by CS, the ex ante
expected payo of R under the one shot information transmission is given by
EURCS =  r
 
1
12n2
+
b2(n2   1)
3
!
:
2.6. Generalization of Proposition 2.4 and 2.6 33
The maximum number of partition equilibrium outcomes n˜ is given by
n˜ 
26666666 12 + 12

1 +
2
b
 1
2
37777777 ;
where dxe denotes the smallest integer greater than or equal to x. We can immediately
verify that EURCS <  rb2 for n  2, and thus R prefers delegation to the one shot
information transmission whenever informative communication is possible.
In contrast, under eective T-period communication, R can obtain the ex ante
expected payo as well as  16rb3=3 when T is suciently large and s is small relative
to r. We can verify immediately that  16rb3=3 >  rb2 when b < 3=16.
Next, consider a communication protocol arbitration where the players can send
messages to a neutral third party (arbitrator), and after having received the messages,
the arbitrator announces an project. This announcement serves as a binding recommen-
dation toR. Namely,R cannot choose any action that is dierent from the recommended
one. Goltsman et al. (2009) characterizes the optimal arbitration rule and shows that
the R’s ex ante expected payo under optimal arbitration is  rb2(1   4b=3).16 We can
immediately verify that  16rb3=3 >  rb2(1   4b=3) when b < 3=20.
Therefore, Proposition 2.11 implies that when the length of the communication
round is high and R places greater importance on the project than S does, R can obtain
higher ex ante expected payo under eective T-period communication than those
under delegation and arbitration.17
2.6 Generalization of Proposition 2.4 and 2.6
In this section,we show the following two results under themore general settingswhere
the players’ payo functions and the prior probability of the state are not restricted to
the uniform-quadratic case but those described in Section 2.2. One is that if T  2 and r
is large relative to s, R can obtain more detailed information in our model than that in a
model with one-shot information transmission. The other is that if T  2 and r is large
relative to s, there exists an equilibrium whose outcome ex ante Pareto-dominates all
equilibrium outcomes in a model with one-shot information transmission.
We now show that the first result. Recall that n˜(b) denotes the maximum number
of elements of equilibrium partition achievable in a model with one-shot information
transmission. As can be seen from the uniform-quadratic case, under our equilibrium
16Having restricted attention to deterministic mechanism, Melumad and Shibano (1991) provided the
optimal arbitration (optimal delegation) rule.
17Since the optimal arbitration rule dominates the optimal mediation rule, our communication protocol
could also strictly dominate the optimal mediation rule.
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construction in Proposition 2.4, it is necessary that after S conveys some information
in period 1, there are multiple equilibria in the remaining game. Therefore, we assume
that n˜(b)  2. In a model with one-shot information transmission, if Condition M
holds, then the most informative equilibrium is n˜(b)-element partition equilibrium
where f[a˜n˜(b); a˜n˜(b) 1); : : : [a˜1; a˜0]g, and 0 = a˜n˜(b) < a˜n˜(b) 1 <    < a˜1 < a˜0 = 1.
The following Proposition 2.12 establishes that in multistage information transmis-
sion with voluntary monetary transfer, there exists an equilibrium whose partition has
more steps that that in a model with one-shot information transmission.
Proposition 2.12. Fix b > 0 and suppose that n˜  n˜(b)  2. Then, there exists a positive value
(b) such that if s=r < (b), then there exists an equilibrium with a (n˜ + 1)-element partition.
To prove this Proposition, we construct a strategy profile that induces a (n˜ + 1)-
element partition: f[aˆn˜+1; aˆn˜); : : : [aˆ1; aˆ0]g, and 0 = aˆn˜+1 < aˆn˜ <    < aˆ1 < aˆ0 = 1. The
following strategy profile is an extension of the strategy profile that we construct in
Section 2.5.1.
At stage 1 in period 1, S of type   aˆ1 sends a message m1 randomly according to
a uniform distribution over [aˆ1; 1], and S of type  < aˆ1 sends a message m1 randomly
according to a uniform distribution over [0; aˆ1). If m1 < aˆ1, then R pays a certain
amount of money, w, to S at stage 2 in period 1. Otherwise, she pays nothing to
S. If m1 < aˆ1 and w1  w, then, at stage 1 in period 2, S of type   aˆ2 sends a
message m2 randomly according to a uniform distribution over [aˆ2; 1], and S of type
 2 [aˆi+1; aˆi), for i 2 f2; : : : ; n˜g, sends a message m2 randomly according to a uniform
distribution over [aˆi+1; aˆi). Otherwise, S sends a message m2 randomly according to
uniform distribution over [0; 1] regardless of his type. In period t  2, R always pays
nothing to S. In period t  3, S always sends babbling message. In period T + 1, R
chooses a project (hT+1)  argmaxy
R
uR(y; ) f (jhT+1)d. In what follows, we denote
by (ˆ; ˆ) the strategy profile defined above, and denote by fˆ the belief system derived
from (ˆ; ˆ).
Under the above strategy profile, we have to take an equilibrium partition whose
boundaries faˆn˜; : : : ; aˆ2g coincide with those of the n˜-element partition equilibrium in
the CS model where state space is [0; a˜1). Moreover, it must be satisfied that w =
s  uS(y(a2; a1); a1; b)   s  uS(y(a1; 1); a1; b) > 0. Therefore, if  is close to aˆ1 and  < aˆ1,
then S strictly prefers the project y(aˆ1; 1) to the project y(aˆ2; aˆ1). Hence, R pays money
w after receiving the message that “m1 < aˆ1” so that S’s type  < aˆ1 would not lie to
her. Since R cannot commit to compensate for S’s message, the following inequality
must be hold for paying w to be optimal for R.
r
G(aˆ1)
n˜X
i=1
Z aˆi
aˆi+1
uR(y(aˆi+1; aˆi); )g()d   rG(aˆ1)
Z aˆ1
0
uR
 
y(0; aˆ1); 

g()d  w: (2.12)
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?
(w1 = 0)
mt =babbling
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?

0
aˆn˜+1 m2
1
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?
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?
(w1 < w)
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Figure 2.4: Equilibrium
The left-hand side of this inequality represents the value of additional information,
that is, the value of the partition f[0; aˆn˜); : : : ; [aˆ2; aˆ1)g, that R receives in period 2 by
paying w after receiving m1 < aˆ1. It is obvious that R always strictly prefers the
partition f[0; aˆn˜); : : : ; [aˆ2; aˆ1)g to the partition f[0; aˆ1)g. This implies that the left-hand side
of the inequality (2.12) is positive and increasing in r when n˜  2. Moreover, since
w = s  uS(y(a1; 1); a1; b)   s  uS(y(a2; a1); a1; b),18 the right-hand side of the inequality
(2.12) is decreasing and goes to 0 as s goes to 0. Therefore, if r is large enough relative
to s, then R has incentive to pay w after receiving the message m1 < aˆ1.
In Appendix 2.G, we make sure that there exists (b) > 0 such that if sr < (b), by
taking the boundaries of the partition f[aˆn˜+1; aˆn˜); : : : [aˆ1; aˆ0]g suitably, ((ˆ; ˆ); fˆ ) constitutes
an equilibrium.
Next, we show that under some conditions, multistage information transmission
with voluntary monetary transfer is more beneficial to both R and S than one-shot
information transmission. To see this, we focus on the equilibrium, ((ˆ; ˆ); fˆ ), that we
constructed to prove the Proposition 2.12.
Let f[aˆxn˜+1; aˆxn˜); : : : [aˆx1; aˆx0]g be the partitionwhose boundaries faˆxn˜; : : : ; aˆx2g coincidewith
those of the n˜-element partition equilibrium in the CS model where state space is [0; x).
We denote by EUˆR(x) the ex ante expected payo of R under ((ˆ; ˆ); fˆ ) with (n˜ + 1)-
element partition: f[aˆxn˜+1; aˆxn˜); : : : [aˆx1; aˆx0]g where aˆx1  x 2 (a1(s=r); 1). Let a1(s=r) be the
infimum value of z such that (2.12) holds for all x 2 (z; 1).19
18Recall the Figure 2.2 in Section 2.5.1.
19The formal characterization of a1(s=r) can be found in Appendix 2.G.
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We have
EUˆR(x) = Wˆ(x)   E[w]:
where Wˆ(x) denotes R’s ex ante expected utility from project:
Wˆ(x)  r
n˜+1X
i=1
Z aˆxi 1
aˆxi
uR(y(aˆxi ; aˆ
x
i 1); )g()d:
CS have shown that in a model with one-shot information transmission, under Condi-
tionM,R always strictly prefers n˜-element partition equilibrium to any other equilibria.
We denote by EURCS the ex ante expected payo ofR under the n˜-element partition equi-
librium in a model with one-shot information transmission. We have
EURCS = r
n˜X
i=1
Z a˜i 1
a˜i
uR(y(a˜i; a˜i 1); )g()d:
The boundaries faˆxn˜+1; aˆxn˜; : : : ; aˆx1g almost coincides with the boundaries fa˜n˜; a˜n˜ 1; : : : ; a˜0g
induced by n˜-element partition equilibrium in a model with one-shot information
transmission when aˆx1  1. Therefore, we have limx"1 Wˆ(x) = EURCS: This implies that
Wˆ(x) > EURCS for some x 2 (a1(s=r); 1) when the following Condition C holds.
Condition C . ddx

x=1 Wˆ(x) < 0:
In what follows, we restrict attention to ((UR;US);G) under which Condition C
holds. Note that there exists a pair of players payo functions and the prior distribution
of state, ((UR;US);G), under which Condition C holds. For details, see Appendix 2.K. It
is not true that Condition M implies that Condition C. In Remark 2.7 in Appendix 2.K,
we provide an example in which Condition M is satisfied, while Condition C is not.
Under this condition, for some aˆx1  x 2 (a1(s=r); 1), the partition f[aˆxn˜+1; aˆxn˜); : : : [aˆx1; aˆx0]g
ismore informative forRwith respect to theproject than thepartition f[a˜n˜; a˜n˜ 1); : : : [a˜1; a˜0]g.
However, evenwhenConditionCholds, it is not true thatmultistage information trans-
mission with voluntary monetary transfer is always beneficial to R since she has to pay
money w to S in order to obtain valuable information.
We now show the following Proposition 2.13.
Proposition 2.13. Fix b > 0 and suppose that n˜  2 and Condition C holds. Then there exists
a positive value ˜(b) such that if s=r < ˜(b), there exists a (n˜+ 1)-element partition equilibrium
whose outcome ex ante Pareto-dominates all the equilibrium outcomes in a model with one-shot
information transmission.
We prove Proposition 2.13 by three steps. Let ((ˆ; ˆ); fˆ ) be a partition equilibrium
constructed in Proposition 2.12. First, we show that if sr < (b), there exists a (n˜ + 1)-
element partition equilibrium which S prefers to all equilibria in  (b; s; r; 1). This result
2.6. Generalization of Proposition 2.4 and 2.6 37
can be summarized as Lemma 2.2. Second, we show that there exists a positive value
(b) such that if sr < (b), there exists a (n˜ + 1)-element partition equilibrium which R
prefers to all equilibria in  (b; s; r; 1). This result can be summarized as Lemma 2.3.
Finally, we show that there exists a positive value ˜(b) such that if sr < ˜(b), the intersec-
tion of the following two sets is nonempty: the set of (n˜+1)-element partition equilibria
which S prefers to all equilibria in  (b; s; r; 1) and the set of (n˜ + 1)-element partition
equilibria which R prefers to all the equilibria in  (b; s; r; 1).
Now, we show the following Lemma 2.2.
Lemma 2.2. Fix b > 0 and suppose that n˜  2. If s=r < (b), there exists a (n˜ + 1)-element
partition equilibrium ((ˆ; ˆ); fˆ ) such that S always strictly prefers ((ˆ; ˆ); fˆ ) to any equilibrium
in a model with one-shot information transmission.
Now, we denote by EUSCS the ex ante expected payo of S under the n˜-element
partition equilibrium with fa˜n˜; : : : ; a˜0g in a model with one-shot information transmis-
sion. We denote by EUˆS(x) the ex ante expected payo of S under the (n˜ + 1)-element
partition equilibrium ((ˆ; ˆ); fˆ ) with (n˜ + 1)-element partition: f[aˆxn˜(b)+1; aˆxn˜(b)); : : : [aˆx1; aˆx0]g
where aˆx1  x 2 (a1(s=r); 1).
Since the boundaries faˆxn˜+1; : : : ; aˆx1g almost coincides with the boundaries fa˜n˜; : : : ; a˜0g
when aˆx1  1, by taking x suitably, we have EUˆS(x)   EUSCS > 0:
Next, we show the following Lemma 2.3.
Lemma 2.3. Fix b > 0 and suppose that n˜  2. Then, there exists a positive value (b) such
that if s=r < (b), there exists x; x 2 (a1(s=r); 1) such that
EUˆR(x) > EURCS and EUˆ
R(x) < EURCS:
Intuitively, R seems to prefer the (n˜ + 1)-element partition with faˆxn˜(b)+1; : : : ; aˆx0g to
the n˜-element partition with fa˜n˜; : : : ; a˜0g since the former has more steps than the latter.
We have already shown that if Condition C holds , then there exists x < 1 such that
Wˆ(x) > EURCS. Fix x, then Wˆ(x)   EURCS is increasing in r. Since, moreover, w is
decreasing and goes to 0 as s goes to 0, the expected payment E[w] is also decreasing
and goes to 0 as s goes to 0. Thus, if r is large enough relative to s, then there exists x
such that EUˆR(x) > EURCS.
Now, fix s and r. Then, Wˆ(x)   EURCS goes to 0 as x goes to 1 since faˆxn˜+1; : : : ; aˆx1g
converges to fa˜n˜; : : : ; a˜0g as x goes to 1 . Nevertheless, w goes to s  uS(yR(1); 1; b)   s 
uS(y(a˜1; 1); 1; b) > 0 and Pr(m1 < x)  1 as x goes to 1.20 This means that E[w] goes to
20For details, see Appendix 2.G.
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s  uS(yR(1); 1; b)   s  uS(y(a˜1; 1); 1; b) > 0 as x goes to 1. Hence, there always exists x  1
such that EUˆR(x) < EURCS:
Finally, we complete the proof of Proposition 2.13 by demonstrating that if r is large
enough relative to s, then we can take x 2 (a1(s=r); 1) such that
EUˆR(x) > EURCS and EUˆ
S(x) > EUSCS:
The formal proof of Lemma2.2–2.3, andProposition 2.13 canbe found inAppendix 2.H–
2.J.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we studied multistage information transmission with voluntary mon-
etary transfer in the framework of the CS model. We have shown that multistage
information transmission with voluntary monetary transfer can lead to more informa-
tive equilibrium outcomes than those in the CS model. Moreover, we have shown that
under multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfer, there
exists an equilibrium whose outcome Pareto-dominates all the equilibrium outcomes
in the CS model.
We have provided an upper bound (not necessarily the least upper bound) of R’s
ex ante expected payo under partition equilibria. Moreover, we have provided a
sucient condition for this upper bound to be approximated by an R’s equilibrium
payo. Consequently, we show that when the length of the communication round
is high and R places greater importance on the project than S does, R can obtain
higher ex ante expected payounder eectiveT-period communication than that under
delegation.
A full characterization of all equilibria in our model remains an open question.
Appendix
Appendix 2.A Proof of Proposition 2.2
Fix a pure strategy equilibrium under a direct contract (; !). Then, the existence of a
family of sets fIg2 that satisfies the conditions 1–3 in Definition 2.2 is trivial. Hence,
we have only to make sure that I is convex for each  2 . First, we show that the R’s
strategy regarding the project, y : ! Y, satisfies the following property.
Lemma 2.4. In a pure strategy equilibrium under a direct contract (; !), the receiver’s
strategy regarding the project, y(), is nondecreasing.
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Proof of Lemma 2.4. From S’s incentive compatibility condition, for any ; 0 2 ,
uS(y(); ; b) + !()  uS(y(0); ; b) + !(0); and
uS(y(0); 0; b) + !(0)  uS(y(); 0; b) + !():
This implies that
uS(y(); ; b)   uS(y(0); ; b)  uS(y(); 0; b)   uS(y(0); 0; b)
Since we suppose that uS1;2 > 0, we have y()  y(0) for  > 0. 
From this lemma, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 2.5. In a pure strategy equilibrium under a direct contract (; !), if y() = y() for
 < , then y() = y() = y() for all  2 [; ]. Moreover, !() = !() = !() for all
 2 [; ].
Lemma 2.5 implies the convexity of I. ^
Appendix 2.B Proof of Proposition 2.3
We now suppose that there exists a fully separating equilibrium F. Let (; !F) be a
direct contract under which there exists a pure strategy equilibrium that is outcome
equivalent to F. Let y() be the R’s equilibrium strategy under (; !F). Since R
learns the true state eventually under F, y() = yR() in the pure strategy equilibrium
under (; !F). When truth telling is a best response for S, it is necessary to satisfy the
condition:
s  uS(yR(); ; b) + !()  s  uS(yR(0); ; b) + !(0) for all 0 , .
From the first-order condition, we have the dierential equation
d
d
!() =  s  uS1(yR(); ; b)
d
d
yR():
Since uS1(y
R(); ; b) > 0 and y0R()  dd yR() > 0, S’s incentive compatibility condition
requires that
!() = !(1) +
Z 1

s  uS1(yR(z); z; b)y0R(z)dz: (2.13)
From the condition (2.13), the compensation schedule that induces full revelation is
strictly decreasing in . Finally, we show that R’s payment strategy satisfing the
condition (2.13) cannot be optimal for her. Let m˜ be a sequence of messages that
belongs to suppF(j = 0). Since
PT
t=1wt(m˜) = !(0) > 0 and wT(m˜) = 0, there exists
t˜ 2 f1; : : : ;T   1g such that wt˜(m˜) > 0 and wt(m˜) = 0 for all t 2 ft˜ + 1; : : : ;Tg.21 Since
21Since R cannot obtain additional information about  after stage 2 in period T, she has no incentive to
choose wT > 0.
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!(0) is the maximum value of !(), under the given equilibrium F, there exists an
on-the-path history h˜ 2 H(t˜;2), where R pays a positive amount of money to S at this
history and never pays money after this history; (h˜) > 0 and (h˜+) = 0 for any
h˜+ 2 fh 2 [T
t=t˜+1
H(t;2) : h is consistent with h˜ and on-the-path historyg. Note that given
m˜, the history h˜ occurs with probability one by the assumption that we suppose that
R’s strategy is a pure strategy. Since F is a full separating equilibrium, R chooses yR(0)
after h˜. Therefore, she has no incentive to pay a positive amount of money at h˜. For all
m 2 suppF(j = 0), the same is true. This means that the given R’s payment strategy
does not satisfy the equilibrium condition. ^
Appendix 2.C Proof of Proposition 2.8
Fix an equilibrium . Let (; !) be a direct contract under which there exists a pure
strategy equilibrium that is outcome equivalent to . Let y() be the R’s equilibrium
strategy under (; !). We have already shown that  is a partition equilibrium in the
proof of Proposition 2.2. Let ˆ be the set of the boundaries of equilibrium partition.
First, we show the following Lemma 2.6.
Lemma 2.6. If there exists open intervals (k+1; k) and ( j;  j 1) such that k+1 < k   j <
 j 1 and (k+1; k), ( j;  j 1)  ˆ, then
 ! is strictly decreasing in  over (k+1; k) and ( j;  j 1), and
 lim"k !()  ! > !  lim# j !().
Proof of Lemma 2.6. First, we show that! is strictly decreasing in  over (k+1; k) and
( j;  j 1). For all  2 (k+1; k), the truth telling to be a best response requires that
s  uS(yR(); ; b) + !()  s  uS(yR(0); ; b) + !(0) for all 0;  2 (k+1; k).
The first-order condition for S results in the dierential equation
d
d
!() =  s  uS1(yR(); ; b)
d
d
yR():
Since uS1(y
R(); ; b) > 0 and y0R()  dd yR() > 0, S’s incentive compatibility condition
requires that
!() = !(k) +
Z k

s  uS1(yR(z); z; b)y0R(z)dz: (2.14)
The same argument holds for interval ( j;  j 1). Hence, we have
!() = !( j 1) +
Z  j 1

s  uS1(yR(z); z; b)y0R(z)dz: (2.15)
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From the conditions (2.14) and (2.15), the compensation schedule that induces the
full revelation is strictly decreasing in  over (k+1; k) and ( j;  j 1).
To simplify the proof, we now suppose that there exists no open interval (; ) 
(k;  j) such that (; )  ˆ. Since we now consider the uniform-quadratic case, the
equilibrium payos of S of type k and  j are  sb2+! and  sb2+!, respectively. More-
over, under the uniform-quadratic assumption, if [0; 00] is an element of equilibrium
partition22 such that 0 < 00, then
lim
#0
s  uS(y(); ; b) + !0 = s  uS(y(0); 0; b) + !0
> s  uS(y(00); 00; b) + !00 = lim
"00
s  uS(y(); ; b) + !00
where !0 = !00 = !() for  2 (0; 00) since s  uS(y(0); 0; b) = s((0 + 00)=2   0   b)2
and s  uS(y(00); 00; b) = s((0 + 00)=2   00   b)2. We have
s  uS((0 + 00)=2; 0; b) > s  uS((0 + 00)=2; 00; b): (2.16)
From the conditions (2.14)–(2.16), we can conclude that s  uS(y(); ; b) + !() is
strictly decreasing in  over (k+1;  j 1) \ ˆ. Therefore, we have
lim
"k
s  uS(y(); ; b) + !() =  sb2 + !
>  sb2 + ! = lim
# j
s  uS(y(); ; b):
This completes the proof of Lemma 2.6. 
Now we suppose that there exists an open interval (k+1; k)  ˆ. Lemma 2.6 implies
that for almost every ˆ 2 (k+1; k), there is no ˜ 2  n (k+1; k) such that !(˜) = !(ˆ).
This means that R surely reaches a history such that she pays positive amount of
money to S even though she has already known the S’s type. This holds almost every
 2 (k+1; k). Hence, we can conclude that there exists no open interval (k+1; k) such
that (k+1; k)  ˆ.
Next, we show that the cardinality of ˆ is finite. We prove this by contradiction.
Now, suppose that the cardinality of ˆ is countably infinite. Then, we can take an
infinite sequence fngn2N such that
 limn!1 n = L for some L 2 ˆ,
  < ˆ for any  2 (inffngn2N; supfngn2N) n fngn2N, and
 supfngn2N   inffngn2N < 4b.
22The same argument holds for the cases of [0; 00), (0; 00] and (0; 00)
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Since supfngn2N   inffngn2N < 4b, we have n0   n < 4b for n < n0.
Define o, o and o as elements of fngn2N such that o < o < o and  < ˆ for any
 2 (o; o) n fog. Let !o be !(o) for o 2 (o; o). Let !o be !(o) for o 2 (o; o). Then, we
have s  uS(y(o); o; b) + !o = s  uS(y(o); o; b) + !o. Since o   o < o   o + 4b, we have
!o   !o = s  uS(y(o); o; b)   s  uS(y(o); o; b) > 0. Therefore, the image of ! the subset
(inffngn2N; supfngn2N)   under ! is a countably infinite set. Now, suppose that
#fˆ n fngn2Ng < 1. Then, there exists an open interval (v; v)  (inffngn2N; supfngn2N)
such that
 !(v0) = !(v00) and y(v0) = y(v00) for all v0; v00 2 (v; v), and
 !(v0) , !(v˜) and y(v0) , y(v˜) for any v˜ < (v; v).
This means that if the S’s type belongs to (v; v), then R surely reaches a history such that
she pays positive amount of money to S even though she does not obtain additional
information in the future. Hence, under the given strategy profile, R reaches such a
history with positive probabilities: Pr( 2 (v; v)). Hence, we can conclude that there
must be #fˆ n fngn2Ng = +1.　 This implies that we can take an infinite sequence
f˜g2N such that
 lim!1 ˜ = 	 for some	 2  n (inffngn2N; supfngn2N);
 ˆ < ˆ for any ˆ 2 (inff˜g2N; supf˜g2N) n f˜g2N;
 supf˜g2N   inff˜g2N < 4b.
In the same way as in the proof of Lemma 2.6, we can make sure that f!() :  2
(inffngn2N; supfngn2N)g \ f!() :  2 (inff˜g2N; supf˜g2N)g = ;. Therefore, under
the given strategy profile, R reaches a history such that she pays positive amount of
money to S even though she does not obtain additional information in the future, even
if #fˆ n fngn2Ng = +1. This means that the given R’s payment strategy does not satisfy
the equilibrium condition. Therefore, the cardinality of ˆmust be finite. ^
Appendix 2.D Proof of Proposition 2.9
Wemake sure that  16rb3=3 is an upper bound (not necessarily the least upper bound)
of R’s ex ante expected payo under partition equilibria. Fix an equilibrium , and
a (S’s incentive compatible) direct contract (; !), which is outcome equivalent to .
Suppose that !() is decreasing. Then, for R’s payment strategy to be optimal, there
must be two elements equilibrium partition, [0; a0) and [a0; a00), wherew(0) = w(00) for
0 2 [0; a0) and 00 2 [a0; a00). This means that the boundary a0 must coincide with the
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boundary of the 2-element partition (CS) equilibrium where the state space is [0; a00). If
a00 < 4b, then S’s indierent condition s  uS(y(0; a0); a0; b)   s  uS(y(a0; a00); a0; b) = 0 has
no solution. Therefore, it must be satisfied that a00  4bwhen !() is decreasing.
Now we suppose that !() is nondecreasing. Then, there are two elements of
equilibrium partition, [a; a0] and (a0; a00], where w(0) < w(00) for 0 2 [a; a0] and 00 2
(a0; a00]. Now, we allow the case where a = a0, this means that S tells the truth when
 = a. For S’s indierent condition, it must be satisfied that
US(y(0); 0; !(0)) = US(y(00); 00; !(00))
This implies that
!(00)   !(0) = s
"a0 + a00
2
  a0   b
2
 
a + a0
2
  a0   b
2#
> 0:
Therefore, it must be satisfied that a0 a+4b < a00  a023. Hence, we conclude that R’s ex
ante expected payo under (; !) is lower than  16rb3=3. This implies that  16rb3=3 is
an upper bound (not necessarily the least upper bound) of R’s ex ante expected payo
under partition equilibria. ^
uS

a00a a0

u0
u00
!(00)   !(0) = u0   u00 < 0.
Figure 2.5: a00   a0 < a0   a + 4b
Appendix 2.E Proof of Proposition 2.10
First, we now make sure of the optimality of S’s strategy. At history h(t;1) in which
wt0 < wt0 or mt0  at0 for some t0 < t, any type of S send a message randomly according
to the same distribution, a uniform distribution over [0; 1]. Therefore, there is no
profitable deviation for S at such a history.
At history h(1;1) or h(t;1) in which mt0 < at0 and wt0  wt0 for all t0 < t, if S of type
 sends mt  at, then he will obtain  s

at+at 1
2   ( + b)
2
in the future. Otherwise, the
23See Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6.
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uS

a00a a0
u0
u00 !(00)   !(0) = u0   u00 > 0.
Figure 2.6: a00   a0 > a0   a + 4b
continuation payo of S can be  s
 at˜+1+at˜
2   ( + b)
2
+
Pt˜
l=tw

l for t˜ 2 ft; : : : ;Tg. By at and
wt defined above, it is easy to verify that for any t˜ 2 ft; : : : ;Tg,
 s
at + at 1
2
  ( + b)
2
>  s
at˜+1 + at˜
2
  ( + b)
2
+
t˜X
l=t
wl for any  > at,(2.17)
 s
at + at 1
2
  ( + b)
2
<  s
at˜+1 + at˜
2
  ( + b)
2
+
t˜X
l=t
wl for any  2 [at˜+1; at˜),(2.18)
 s
at + at 1
2
  ( + b)
2
=  s
at+1 + at
2
  ( + b)
2
+ wt for  = at.(2.19)
Moreover, for  = at,
max
8>><>>: s at˜+1 + at˜2   ( + b)2 +
t˜X
l=t
wl
9>>=>>;
t˜2ft;:::;Tg
=  s
at+1 + at
2
  ( + b)
2
+ wt :
Since these (2.17)–(2.19) hold for any t 2 f1; : : : ;Tg, there is no profitable deviation for S
from T.
Next, we make sure of the optimality of R’s strategy. At any history hT+1 2 HT+1,
the posterior belief f (jhT+1  (h(T;2);wT)) = f (jh(T;2)) is a uniform distribution sup-
ported on an interval whose mid-point is equal to min I(h
T+1)+max I(hT+1)
2 . Therefore,
y = min I(h
T+1)+max I(hT+1)
2 is an optimal project for R at any h
T+1 2 HT+1.
At history h(t;2) in which wt0 < wt0 or mt0  at0 for some t0 < t, R has no chance to
obtain additional information about k in the future. Therefore, he must pay nothing
to S at such a history. At history h(T 1;2) in which he learns  < aT 1 at the preceding
stage 1, mt0 < at0 and wt0  wt0 for all t0 < T   1 and mT 1 < aT 1, if R pays wT 1  wT 1,
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then he obtains uT 1(wT 1):
uT 1(wT 1) =  wT 1   r
T+1X
i=T
Z ai 1
ai
1
aT 1
ai + ai 1
2
  
2
d
=  wT 1   r
 
(aT)3
12aT 1
+
(aT 1   aT)3
12aT 1
!
=  wT 1   r
 
b2 +
(aT 1)2
48
!
:
Clearly, uT 1(wT 1) takes the maximum value u

T 1 at wT 1 = w

T 1. On the other hand,
by paying wT 1 < wT 1, he obtains uT 1(wT 1):
uT 1(wT 1) =  wT 1   r
Z aT 1
0
1
aT 1
aT 1
2
  
2
d
=  wT 1   r (aT 1)
2
12
:
Clearly, uT 1(wT 1) takes the maximum value uT 1 at wT 1 = 0. Therefore, paying wT 1
is optimal for R if and only if uT 1  uT 1.
uT 1  uT 1 () r
 
(aT 1)2
16
  b2
!
 wT 1: (2.20)
By making a suciently close to 0, the left-hand side of this inequality can be made
to be as close to r

1
16   b2

as desired and the right-hand side of this inequality can be
made to be as close to s16 f1 + 12gf1 + 4bg as desired. It is obvious that if sr < 1 4b1+12b , there
exists aˆ(b;T) > 0 such that if a < aˆ(b;T); then uT 1 > uT 1:
At history h(t;2), t 2 f1; : : : ;T   2g, in which he learns  < at at the preceding stage 1,
mt0 < at0 and wt0  wt0 for all t0 < t andmt < at, if R pays wt  wt , then he obtains ut(wt):
ut(wt) =  wt  
TX
i=t+1
wi
ai
ai 1
  r
T+1X
i=t+1
Z ai 1
ai
1
at
ai + ai 1
2
  
2
d
=  wt  
TX
i=t+1
wi
ai
ai 1
  r
 
aT 1b2
at
+
(aT 1)3
48at
+ (T   1   t) (a)
3
48at
!
:
Clearly, ut(wt) takes the maximum value u

t at wt = w

t . On the other hand, by paying
wt < wt , he obtains ut(wt):
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ut(wt) =  wt   r
Z at
0
1
at
at
2
  k
2
dk
=  wt   r (at)
2
12
:
Clearly, ut(wt) takes the maximum value ut at wt = 0. Therefore, paying wt is optimal
for R if and only if ut  ut.
ut  ut () r
 
 aT 1b
2
at
  (aT 1)
3
48at
  (T   1   t) (a)
3
48at
+
(at)2
12
!

TX
i=t+1
wi
ai
ai 1
+ wt : (2.21)
By making a suciently close to 0, the left-hand side of this inequality can be made
to be as close to r

1
16   b2

as desired and the right-hand side of this inequality can be
made to be as close to s16 f1 + 12gf1 + 4bg as desired. It is obvious that if sr < 1 4b1+12b , there
exists a˜(b;T) > 0 such that if a < a˜(b;T), then ut > ut for any t 2 f1; : : : ;T   2g. Take
a < min
n
1+12b
T+1 ;
1 4b
T 1 ; aˆ(b;T); a˜(b;T)
o
. Then, T constitutes an equilibrium. ^
Appendix 2.F Proof of Proposition 2.11
We now impose a condition, a = 1 (4b+")T 1 , on T. Since aT 1 = 4b + " 2 (4b; 1), it must be
satisfied that " 2 (0; 1 4b). Moreover, it holds that a = 1 (4b+")T 1 < 1 4bT 1 < 1+4bT 3 . Therefore,
if a < 1+12bT+1 , ai and w

t are well-defined. We now suppose that T > T˜(b)  18b + 12 , and
then a < 1+12bT+1 for any " 2 (0; 1  4b). Let " be this modified strategy profile and system
of beliefs. The following lemma shows that if r is large relative to s, then " can be an
equilibrium.
Lemma 2.7. Fix b 2 (0; 1=4), and T  T˜(b). Then, for any " 2 (0; 1 4b), there exists (b;T; ")
such that if s=r < (b;T; "), then " can be an equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 2.7. It is obvious that the condition a = 1 (4b+")T 1 only aectsR’s optimal
decision at h(t;2), t 2 f1; : : : ;T   1g, in which he learns  < at at the preceding stage 1,
mt0 < at0 and wt0  wt0 for all t0 < t   1 and mt < at. Therefore, we have only to make
sure whether the inequalities (2.20) and (2.21) hold.
Since aT 1 = 4b + " > 4b, we have (aT 1)
2
16   b2 > 0. Therefore, we have
uT 1  uT 1 ()
s
r
 (aT 1)
2   16b2
f1 + 12b   a(T + 1)gf1 + 4b + a(3   T)g : (2.22)
The left-hand side of the inequality (2.21) can be simplified into
r
aT 1
at
(
4(at)3   (aT 1)3   (T   1   t)a3
48aT 1
  aT 1
at
b2
)
:
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Since at = aT 1 + (T   1   t)a, we have
4(at)3   (aT 1)3   (T   1   t)a3
48aT 1
>
(at)3
16aT 1
>
(at)2
16
> b2 >
aT 1
at
b2:
This implies that
aT 1
at
(
4(at)3   (aT 1)3   (T   1   t)a3
48aT 1
  aT 1
at
b2
)
> 0:
Since, moreover, wt > 0 , the right-hand side of the inequality (2.21) is higher than 0.
Therefore, we have
ut  ut ()
s
r
<
aT 1
at

4(at)3 (aT 1)3 (T 1 t)a3
48aT 1  
aT 1
at b
2

1
s
PT
i=t+1w

i
ai
ai 1
: (2.23)
Note that the value of
wi
s does not depend on s. Now we can conclude that there exists
(b;T; ") such that if sr < (b;T; "), then the inequalities (2.22) and (2.23) hold and "
constitutes an equilibrium. 
We denote by EUR(") the ex ante expected payo of R under a strategy profile ".
EUR(") = rW(")  
TX
i=1
wi
ai
ai 1
:
rW(") denotes the expected revenue from the project under ":
rW(") =  r
T+1X
i=1
Z ai 1
ai
ai + ai 1
2
  
2
d
= r
"
 (4b + ")b2   (4b + ")
3
48
  1
48
f1   (4b + ")g3
(T   1)2
#
:
There exists "(b; d; r) > 0 such that if " 2 (0; "(b; d; r)), then
r
"
 (4b + ")b2   (4b + ")
3
48
#
>  16
3
rb3   d:
This implies that for any " 2 (0; "(b; d; r)), there exists T(b; "; d; r) such that for any
T  T(b; "; d; r),
rW(") >  16
3
rb3   d: (2.24)
Recall that wi is linear increasing in s for all i 2 f1; : : : ;Tg. Suppose that T 
T(b; "; d; r). Then, for any " 2 (0; "(b; d; r)), there exists ˆ(b;T; "; d; r) such that if s <
ˆ(b;T; "; d; r), we have EUR(") >  16rb3=3   d.
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Suppose that T  T(b; d; r) and " 2 (0; "(b; d; r)). By Lemma 2.7, it is obvious that
if sr < (b;T; "), then " constitutes an equilibrium. Therefore, if s < ˜(b;T; "; d; r) 
minfˆ(b;T; "; d; r); r  (b;T; ")g, the strategy profile " constitutes an equilibrium under
which EUR(") >  16rb3=3   d.
We define T(b; d; r) and E(b; d; r) as follows.
T(b; d; r)  max
(
min
"2(0;"(b;d;r))
T(b; "; d; r); T˜(b)
)
; and
E(b; d; r) 
n
" 2 (0; "(b; d; r)) : T(b; "; d; r) = T(b; d; r)
o
:
Define (b;T; d; r) as follows:
(b;T; d; r)  sup
"2E(b;d;r)
˜(b;T; "; d; r):
This completes the proof. ^
Appendix 2.G Proof of Proposition 2.12
LetH be the set of all histories where Rmakes a decision,H  fSTt=1H(t;2)g [HT+1. We
denote by I(h) the closure of the set f 2  : f (jh 2 H) > 0g. Under the belief system
fˆ , we have I(hT+1) 2 f[aˆn˜+1; aˆn˜]; : : : [aˆ1; aˆ0]; [aˆn˜+1; aˆ1]g for any hT+1 2 HT+1. Therefore,
at hT+1 in which I(hT+1) = [aˆi+1; aˆi] for some i 2 f0; : : : n˜g, the optimal project for R
is y(aˆi+1; aˆi)  argmaxy
R aˆi
aˆi+1
uR(y; )g()d, and at hT+1 in which I(hT+1) = [aˆn˜+1; aˆ1],
the optimal project for R is y(aˆn˜+1; aˆ1)  argmaxy
R aˆ1
aˆ0
uR(y; )g()d. Hence, ˆ(hT+1)
becomes y(aˆi+1; aˆi) at hT+1 in which I(hT+1) = [aˆi+1; aˆi] for some i 2 f0; : : : n˜g, and ˆ(hT+1)
becomes y(aˆn˜+1; aˆ1) at hT+1 in which I(hT+1) = [aˆn˜+1; aˆ1]. It is obvious that ˆ(hT+1) is an
optimal action for R at any hT+1 2 HT+1.
In period t  2, R always pays nothing to S. This implies that f[aˆi+1; aˆi)gn˜i=1
must coincide with the n˜-element equilibrium partition achieved in a model with
one shot information transmission where  is drawn from a distribution with density
fg()= R aˆ10 g()dg  1[0;aˆ1)(). Therefore, the boundaries of this partition, f[aˆi+1; aˆi)gn˜i=1,
must be solutions to the following a nonlinear dierence equation whose initial and
terminal conditions are a1 = aˆ1 and an˜+1 = 0, respectively: for i = 2; : : : ; n˜;
s  uS(y(ai+1; ai); ai; b)   s  uS(y(ai; ai 1); ai; b) = 0: (2.25)
When aˆ1 = 1, the solution to (2.25) induces a partition which coincides with n˜-element
equilibrium partition in a model with one shot information transmission. Moreover,
the solution to (2.25), vary continuously with respect to initial condition a1 = aˆ1, and
we now suppose that the solution to (2.1)–(2.3), fa˜0; : : : ; a˜n˜g, induces a partition: 0 =
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a˜n˜ <    < a˜0 = 1. Therefore, there exists x < 1 such that (2.25) is well-defined for all
aˆ1 2 (x; 1). Let a1 be the minimum value of x such that for all aˆ1 2 (x; 1), the solution to
(2.25) induces a n˜-element partition: 0 = an˜+1 < an˜ <    < a1 = aˆ1. Since the solution to
(2.25) does not depends on both s and r, the value of a1 also does not depends on both
s and r.
If faˆ2; : : : ; aˆn˜+1g is a solution to (2.25)where aˆ1 2 (a1; 1), there is no profitable deviation
for S from ˆ at any h(2;1)

in which m1 < aˆ1 and w1  w. Moreover, S always sends a
babbling message at any h(2;1)

in which m1  aˆ1, or m1 < a1 and w1 < w. The same can
be said at any h(t;1)

for t  3. This implies that if faˆ1; : : : ; aˆn˜+1g is a solution to (2.25) where
aˆ1 2 (a1; 1), then ˆ is optimal for S at any h(t;1) for t  2. Therefore, in what follows, we
suppose that faˆ2; : : : ; aˆn˜+1g is a solution to (2.25) where aˆ1 2 (a1; 1).
At stage 1 in period 1, if S of type  sendsm1  aˆ1, then he obtains s uS  y(aˆ1; 1); ; b.
Otherwise, S of type   aˆ2 obtains s  uS  y(aˆ2; aˆ1); ; b + w, and S of type  2 [aˆi+1; aˆi),
for i  2, obtains s  uS  y(aˆi+1; aˆi); ; b + w. We assume that uS11 < 0 and uS12 > 0.
Moreover, it holds that y(aˆi+1; aˆi) > y(aˆi; aˆi 1). Therefore, if it is satisfied that
s  uS  y(aˆ1; 1); aˆ1; b   s  uS  y(aˆ2; aˆ1); aˆ1; b = w; then (2.26)
s  uS  y(aˆ1; 1); ; b  max
j2f1;:::;n˜g
s  uS

y(aˆ j+1; aˆ j); ; b

+ w for   aˆ1, and (2.27)
s  uS  y(aˆi+1; aˆi); ; b + w > s  uS  y(aˆ1; 1); ; b for i  1 and  2 [aˆi+1; aˆi).(2.28)
When (2.27) and (2.28) hold, S has no incentive to deviate from ˆ at stage 1 in period 1.
Since we assume that R’s payment must be nonnegative, w must be nonnegative. We
now make sure that R’s payment, w(aˆ1)  s  uS  y(aˆ1; 1); aˆ1; b   s  uS  y(aˆ2; aˆ1); aˆ1; b,
that holds the equation (2.26) is positive for any aˆ1 2 (a1; 1). If w(aˆ1) = 0 for some
aˆ1 2 (a1; 1), then (2.1)–(2.3) has a solutions: 0 = aˆn˜+1 < aˆn˜ <    < aˆ0 = 1. This is
incompatible with the definition of n˜. Since y(aˆ1; 1), y(aˆ2; aˆ1) and aˆ2 is continuous in
aˆ1 2 (a1; 1], w(aˆ1) is continuous in aˆ1 2 (a1; 1]. Since, moreover, aˆ2 = a˜1 when aˆ1 = 1, we
have w(1) = s  uS(yR(1); 1; b)   s  uS(y(a˜1; 1); 1; b). Note that w(1) > 0 since uS11 < 0 and
y(a˜1; 1) < yR(1) < yS(1; b). Therefore, w(aˆ1) > 0 for any aˆ1 2 (a1; 1].
At any h(t;2), R has no incentive to increase the amount of payment because that
does not aect S’s behavior. Therefore, we have only to make sure the optimality of 
at h(1;2) in which m1 < aˆ1. At history h(1;2) in which m1 < aˆ1, if R pays w1 < w, then she
obtains u(w1):
u(w1) =  w1 + rG(aˆ1)
Z aˆ1
0
uR
 
y(0; aˆ1); 

g()d:
Clearly, u(w1) takes the maximum value u at w1 = 0. On the other hand, by paying
w1  w at history h(1;2) in which m1 < a1, she obtains u(w1):
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u(w1) =  w1 + rG(aˆ1)
n˜X
i=1
Z aˆi
aˆi+1
uR(y(aˆi+1; aˆi); )g()d:
Clearly, u(w1) takes the maximum value u at w1 = w. Therefore, paying w is an
optimal decision for R at h(1;2) in which m1 < aˆ1 if and only if
u  u ()
r
G(aˆ1)
n˜X
i=1
Z aˆi
aˆi+1
uR(y(aˆi+1; aˆi); )g()d   rG(aˆ1)
Z aˆ1
0
uR
 
y(0; aˆ1); 

g()d  w:(2.29)
We denote by r  V(aˆ1) the left-hand side of the inequality (2.29). V(aˆ1) is continuous
in aˆ1 2 (a1; 1], and V(aˆ1) > 0 for aˆ1 2 (a1; 1]. Moreover, V(1) = EURCS;n˜   EURCS;ui
where EURCS;n˜ 
Pn˜
i=1
R a˜i 1
a˜i
uR(y(a˜i; a˜i 1); )g()d and EURCS;ui 
R 1
0 u
R(y(0; 1); )g()d.
Let (aˆ1) be uS
 
y(aˆ1; 1); aˆ1; b
   uS  y(aˆ2; aˆ1); aˆ1; b. In what follows, s  (aˆ1) denotes R’s
payment, w(aˆ1), that holds the equation (2.26). The inequality (2.29) can be simplified
into sr  V(aˆ1)(aˆ1) . It is obvious that
V(aˆ1)
(aˆ1)
is continuous in aˆ1 2 (a1; 1], and
V(1)
(1)
=
EURCS;n˜   EURCS;ui
uS(y(1); 1; b)   uS(y(a˜1; 1); 1; b) > 0:
Therefore, if sr < (b)  V(1)(1) , then faˆ1 2 (a1; 1) : s=r  V(aˆ1)=(aˆ1)g , ;. This implies
that if sr < (b), there exists a nonempty set faˆ1 2 (a1; 1) : s=r  V(aˆ1)=(aˆ1)g such that
((ˆ; ˆ); fˆ ) constitutes a (n˜ + 1)-element partition equilibrium when aˆ1 2 faˆ1 2 (a1; 1) :
s=r  V(aˆ1)=(aˆ1)g. ^
Remark 2.4. Since V(1)(1) = (b) > 0 and
V(aˆ1)
(aˆ1)
is continuous in aˆ1 2 (a1; 1], there exists
z 2 (a1; 1) such that sr  V(aˆ1)(aˆ1) holds for any aˆ1 2 (z; 1). Let a1(s=r) be the infimum value
of z. Since V(aˆ1)(aˆ1) is continuous in aˆ1 2 (a1; 1] and
V(aˆ1)
(aˆ1)
> 0 for all aˆ1 2 (a1; 1], the value of
a1(s=r) is strictly decreasing and goes to a1 as
s
r goes to 0.
Appendix 2.H Proof of Lemma 2.2
Crawford and Sobel have shown that in a model with one-shot information trans-
mission, under Condition M, S always strictly prefers ex ante n˜-element partition
equilibrium to any other equilibria. We have
EUSCS = s
n˜X
i=1
Z a˜i 1
a˜i
uS(y(a˜i; a˜i 1); ; b)g()d:
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By Proposition 1, it must be satisfied that sr < (b) in order for an equilibrium
((ˆ; ˆ); fˆ ) to exist. Therefore, in what follows, we suppose that sr < (b).
The ex ante expected payo of S under ((ˆ; ˆ); fˆ ) is
EUˆS(x) = s
2666664 n˜+1X
i=1
Z aˆxi 1
aˆxi
uS(y(aˆxi ; aˆ
x
i 1); ; b)g()d + G(x)  (x)
3777775 :
Recall that s  (x)  w(x) = s  uS  y(x; 1); x; b   s  uS y(aˆx2; x); x; b is positive for
x > a1, and s  (x) is continuous in x > a1.
Let (x) denote EUˆS(x)   EUSCS. Since limx"1 (x) = (1) > 0 and (x) is continuous
in x 2 (a1; 1], there exists d < 1 such that d  a1(s=r) and
(x) > 0 for all x 2 (d; 1) :
This completes the proof of Lemma 2.2. ^
Remark 2.5. Define d(s=r)  inffd : d  a1(s=r) and (x) > 0 for all x 2 (d; 1)g: Since
a1(s=r) is decreasing as
s
r is decreasing and (x) does not depend on both s and r, it is
satisfied that d(s=r) is decreasing (but not always strictly decreasing) as sr is decreasing.
Appendix 2.I Proof of Lemma 2.3
In common with the proof of Lemma 2.2, we suppose that sr < (b).
Let (x; s; r) denote fEUˆR(x)   EURCSg=r. We have
(x; s; r) = Wˆ(x)   s
r
G(x)  (x)  
n˜X
i=1
Z a˜i 1
a˜i
uR(y(a˜i; a˜i 1); )g()d:
It holds that (x; s; r) < 0, if and only if
(b; x) 
Wˆ(x)  Pn˜i=1 R a˜i 1a˜i uR(y(a˜i; a˜i 1); )g()d
G(x)  (x) <
s
r
:
Since (b; x) is continuous in x 2 (a1; 1] and (b; 1) = 0, there exists "ˆ > 0 such that
(b; x) < sr for all x 2 (1   "ˆ; 1).
It holds that (x; s; r) > 0, if and only if
(b; x) >
s
r
:
Since x belongs to (a1(s=r); 1) and infx2(a1(s=r);1)G(x)(x) > 0, (b; x) has a least upper
bound (bjs=r) = supx2(a1(s=r);1) (b; x). Under Condition C, (b; x) > 0 for some x 2
(a1(s=r); 1). This implies that (bjs=r) > 0. Since, moreover, a1(s=r) is not increasing
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as sr is decreasing, (bjs=r) is not decreasing as sr is decreasing. Therefore, we can
take a supremum of the value of sr that satisfies (bjs=r) > sr . We denote by (b) this
supremum. Note that (b) < +1 since Wˆ(x)   Pn˜i=1 R a˜i 1a˜i uR(y(a˜i; a˜i 1); )g()d < +1
for any x 2 (a1; 1). This completes the proof of Lemma 2.3. ^
Remark 2.6. When x almost equal to 1, the partition under the (n˜ + 1)-element par-
tition equilibrium almost coincides with the partition under the n˜-element partition
equilibrium in a model with one-shot information transmission. Nevertheless, the
expected payment of monetary transfer is high (almost coincides with s(1)). There-
fore, if sr < (b), there always exists a (n˜ + 1)-element partition equilibrium which is
unfavorable to R.
Appendix 2.J Proof of Proposition 2.13
Suppose that s
00
r00 <
s0
r0 < (b). In the proof of Lemma 2.3, we have already shown that
fx 2 (a1(s0=r0); 1) : (x; s0; r0) > 0g , ; and fx 2 (a1(s00=r00); 1) : (x; s00; r00) > 0g , ;. Since
a1(s=r) is decreasing as
s
r is decreasing,
fx 2 (a1(s0=r0); 1) : (x; s0; r0) > 0g  fx 2 (a1(s00=r00); 1) : (x; s00; r00) > 0g:
Since, moreover, (b; 1) = 0 and ddx

x=1 (b; x) =
d
dx

x=1 Wˆ(x) < 0, we have
lim
s=r#0
supfx 2 (a1(s=r); 1) : (x; s; r) > 0g = 1:
In the Remark of Lemma 2.2, we have already shown that (x) > 0 for x 2 (d(s=r); 1)
and d(s=r) is not increasing as sr is decreasing. Therefore, there exists ˜(b) such that if
s
r < ˜(b), then fx 2 (a1(s=r); 1) : (x; s; r) > 0g \ (d(s=r); 1) , ;. This completes the proof of
Proposition 2.13. ^
Appendix 2.K Condition C
Suppose that s uS(y; ; b)   s(y  (+ b))2, r uR(y; )   r(y )2, andG() is uniform
distribution over [0; 1]. In this case, the solution of (2.25) is given by
aˆxi =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
1 for i = 0,
x for i = 1,
n˜+1 i
n˜ x   2b(n˜ + 1   i)(i   1) for i = 2; : : : ; n˜,
0 for i = n˜ + 1.
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Wehave already shown that for n˜  2, there exists(b) such that if sr < (b), then ((ˆ; ˆ); fˆ )
constitutes an equilibrium whose partition induced by aˆxi where x 2 (a1(s=r); 1). Note
that y(aˆxi+1; aˆ
x
i ) =
aˆxi+1+aˆ
x
i
2 for i = 0; : : : ; n˜.
The Envelope Theorem yields
d
dx
Wˆ(x) =
n˜X
i=1
g(aˆxi )
daˆxi
dx
[uR(y(aˆxi+1; aˆ
x
i ); aˆ
x
i )   uR(y(aˆxi ; aˆxi 1); aˆxi )]:
Since limx"1 aˆxi = a˜i 1, we have
d
dx

x=1
Wˆ(x) =
n˜ 1X
j=1
g(a˜ j)[uR(y(a˜ j+1; a˜ j); a˜ j)   uR(y(a˜ j; a˜ j 1); a˜ j)] ddx

x=1
aˆxj+1
+g(a˜0)[uR(y(a˜1; a˜0); a˜0)   uR(y(a˜0); a˜0)] ddx

x=1
aˆx1:
Therefore, we have
d
dx

x=1
Wˆ(x) =
n˜ 1X
j=1
266664   a˜ j+1   a˜ j2
!2
+
  a˜ j + a˜ j 1
2
!2377775 n˜   jn˜   1   a˜12 2 :
Since a˜ j =
n˜  j
n˜   2bj(n˜   j),
 
 
a˜ j+1   a˜ j
2
!2
+
  a˜ j + a˜ j 1
2
!2
> 0 for j = 1; : : : ; n˜   1.
Moreover,
n˜ 1X
j=1
266664   a˜ j+1   a˜ j2
!2
+
  a˜ j + a˜ j 1
2
!2377775 n˜   jn˜ <
n˜ 1X
j=1
266664   a˜ j+1   a˜ j2
!2
+
  a˜ j + a˜ j 1
2
!2377775
<
1   a˜1
2
2
:
This establishes ddx

x=1 Wˆ(x) < 0.
Remark 2.7. Suppose that s  uS(y; ; b)   s(y   ( + b))2, r  uR(y; )   r(y   )2, and
G() is a distribution over [0; 1] with a density g() =  2 + 2. By the Theorem 2 in
Crawford and Sobel (1982), all solution to (2.1) satisfy Condition M. By Condition M
and uS13 > 0, we have daˆ
x
i =dx > 0 and
uR(y(a˜ j+1; a˜ j); a˜ j)   uR(y(a˜ j; a˜ j 1); a˜ j)  uS(y(a˜ j+1; a˜ j); a˜ j; b)   uS(y(a˜ j; a˜ j 1); a˜ j; b)  0:
Since g(1) = 0, this means that ddx

x=1 Wˆ(x) > 0.
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Appendix 2.L Construction of P
Let 1 : B(M1)   ! [0; 1] and G : B() ! [0; 1] be S’s behavior strategy at stage 1
in period 1 and the prior probability measure on (;B()), respectively. Note that
1(M˜; ) :  ! [0; 1] is measurable for each M˜ 2 B(M1). First, we induce a product
measure P1 on ( M1;B() 
 B(M1)) as follows: for each ˜ 2 B() and M˜ 2 B(M1),
P1(˜  M˜) =
Z
2˜
1(M˜; )G(d):
Let  11 (W˜) be the set of m1 such that fm1 2 M1 : (;m1) 2 W˜ for some  2 g for
W˜ 2 B(W1). We induce a product measureP1; on (M1W1;B()
B(M1)
B(W1))
as: for each ˜ 2 B(), M˜ 2 B(M1) and W˜ 2 B(W1),
P1;(˜  M˜  W˜) = Pˆ1(˜  fM˜ \  11 (W˜)g);
where Pˆ1;(˜; ) is the probabilitymeasure constructedby the completion of themeasure
space (M1;B(M1);P1;(˜; )) for any ˜ 2 B(). Next, we induce a product measure P2
on (H(2;1)

M2;B(H(2;1) ) 
 B(M1)) as follows: for each H˜ 2 B(H(2;1) ) and M˜ 2 B(M2),
P2(H˜  M˜) =
Z
h2H˜
2(M˜; h)P2;(dh)
where 2 : B(M2)H(2;1) ! [0; 1] denotes S’s behavior strategy at stage 1 in period 2. By
the repeated application of the above result, we can obtain P. Under the given strategy
profile and belief system ((; ); f ), in the same way, we can uniquely determine a
probability measure over the outcomes after any (public or private) history.
3
Communication Enhancement through
Information Acquisition by Uninformed Player
3.1 Introduction
Numerous studies of strategic (cheap talk) communication find that messages con-
veyed by an informed sender (he) can be untrustworthy for the decision maker (she)
when their preferences are misaligned. It is a natural reaction by the decision maker
to this poor information transmission that she would gather information by herself
through investigation activities. In a firm, for example, a manager collects the relevant
information not only by seeking advice from informed experts (e.g., lawyers, strategic
planners, lower-level managers) but also by conducting an investigation (e.g., market
research, geological survey, clinical trial).
For instance, consider a situation where a doctoral student (decision maker or D)
vacillates her major field of study (e.g., empirical IO, theoretical IO, game theory).
She can ask her supervisor (sender or S) for advice to choose the most promising
field. On the one hand, S wants D to choose a promising field; on the other hand,
he wants D to choose the more theoretical field since he is majoring in game theory.
Therefore, S may have preference that do not coincide with that of D. In such a
situation, D attempts to gather information by reading journals and participating in
reading seminars in addition to consulting S. In this chapter, we investigate how D
should gather information to enhance the information transmission by S.
This chapter investigates the interaction between communication and the decision
maker’s information acquisition in the framework of the model provided Crawford
and Sobel (1982). Specifically, we consider a cheap talk model where the decision
maker can gather private and imperfect information before she communicates with the
sender. Such information acquisition is costly and the decision to acquire it is taken
endogenously. Through this information acquisition, the decision maker obtains some
signals that convey partial information about the state. Since these signals are gen-
erated endogenously, how the decision maker acquires information is important. We
assume that the decision maker’s information acquisition is completely unobservable
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to the sender. Therefore, the signals that the decision maker possesses are her private
information. We show that the decision maker’s information acquisition can enhance
communication, even when the precision of the investigation activities is low. This re-
sult implies that the types of investigation activities carried out by the decision maker
are important for communicating eectively rather than the precision of the signals
produced by such investigation activities.
Our analysis is closely related to studies of cheap talk with a partially informed
decision maker. If the decision maker has some private information, then the decision
maker’s private information and the sender’s messages can induce a lottery over her
actions. In such a case, the sender is exposed to risk; in other words, he faces a
higher level of uncertainty than the case in which the decision maker has no private
information. Therefore, he attempts to reduce this risk by sending a more precise
message to the decision maker. By focusing on a particular investigation activity so
that the sender is exposed to the risk of misrepresentation, the receiver can reduce the
sender’s incentive to deceive her into choosing a desirable decision for him.1
Hereafter, wedescribe the relation between our analysis in this chapter andprevious
studies. Seidmann (1990) provides examples in a discrete (state apace) setting based on
the CSmodel to illustrate how the decisionmaker’s private information facilitates com-
munication. Watson (1996) and Olszewski (2004) characterize the conditions related
to the information structure under which full information revelation can be attained.
Watson’s (1996) result relies on the correlation between the sender’s and the decision
maker’s information. In Olszewski (2004), the sender may always tell the truth. This
study shows that if the sender’s honesty concerns are suciently strong, full informa-
tion revelation can be attained. In the studiesmentioned above, both the sender and the
receiver are partially informed. By contrast, in our setting, if the sender reveals his own
private information, then the uncertainty that the decision maker faces is eliminated.
This fact removes the decision maker’s incentives to information acquisition, and then
she heeds the sender’s advice. In such a situation, the sender thus deceives the decision
maker easily. Hence, to begin with, the decision maker should not believe the sender’s
advice. Consequently, in our model, no fully separating equilibrium exists.
The model we analyze is most related to those of Moreno de Barreda (2013) and
Ishida and Shimizu (2016). Both these studies examine models of cheap talk with
informed decision makers within the CS framework.2 In Moreno de Barreda (2013),
1This idea is related to that in the model of noisy communication. See, for example, Krishna and
Morgan (2004), Blume et al. (2007), Goltsman et al. (2009), and Ivanov (2010). In these studies, the risk
of cheating is generated in communication with error, or noise. By contrast, in our model, this risk is
generated by the decision maker’s information acquisition.
2Other studies that assessmodels of cheap talkwith informeddecisionmakerswithin theCS framework
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the decision maker is familiar with the information structure that provides her with a
private signal. MorenodeBarreda (2013) shows that in someenvironments, thedecision
maker would benefit if she committed not to acquire private information. In Ishida
and Shimizu (2016), the decision maker is not familiar with the probability distribution
from which the received signal has been drawn. Precisely, the decision maker faces
higher-order uncertainty regarding the reliability of the information structure. In this
setting, the sender’s message can be a signal of the reliability of the decision maker’s
private signal.
The model we analyze in this chapter diers from these studies in terms of the in-
formation structure. In these studies, the decision maker’s private signal is distributed
with a given prior probability. By contrast, in our analysis, the decision maker’s private
signals are induced by her strategic information acquisition. We investigate how the
decision maker should acquire private information to ensure eective communication
and show that the decision maker should gather information so that the sender is
exposed to the risk of misrepresentation.
Several studies examine information acquisition within the CS model, such as,
Austen-Smith (1994), Venturini (2014), Argenziano et al. (2014), and Pei (2015). These
works focus on the relation between the sender’s information acquisition and commu-
nication. We focus on the relation between thedecisionmaker’s information acquisition
and communication.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we explain ourmodel.
In Section 3.3, we characterize the equilibria. In Section 3.4, we study the benchmark
model in which the decision maker cannot acquire information. We show that only
uninformative equilibria exist in this setting. In Section 3.5, we show how the decision
maker’s information acquisition facilitates communication. In Section 3.6, we discuss
the result in Section 3.5.
3.2 Model
There are two players, an informed sender and an uninformed decision maker. The
decisionmaker has the authority to choose aproject p from the set of projectsP  f0; 1; 2g.
A payo for each player depends on the state of nature as well as a chosen project.
Let  be the state of nature, which is distributed on   f0; 1; 2g with common prior
probability (). The common prior is (0) = (2) = q and (1) = 1   2q. We assume
that q 2 (0; 1=3). After privately observing , the sender sends a message m 2 M to the
decision maker.
include Chen (2009), Chen (2012), Ishida and Shimizu (2015), and Lai (2014).
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The sender can perfectly observe the realized state, and it is his private information.
After observing the state, he sends a cheap talk message m to the decision maker, that
is, sending a message is costless. LetM   be the set of the messages for the sender.
The decisionmaker cannot directly observe the true state. However, before receiv-
ing a message, she can obtain noisy signals through an investigation. The investigation
consists of three activities. Let as  0 be the time the decision maker spends on the
state s. The decision maker decides on the allocation of time a = (a0; a1; a2). We call a an
investigation vector. We assume that time is limited and that a0 + a1 + a2  1. Define
A  fa : as  0 and a0 + a1 + a2  1g as a feasible set of the investigation vectors.
Each activity provides a noisy signal related to the corresponding state. The in-
vestigation activity on the state s creates a signal s 2 s  ft; f g. After choosing
a = (a0; a1; a2), the decision maker privately observes three signals 0, 1 and 2. Let
 = (0; 1; 2) be a signal vector. Both a and  are unobservable to the sender.
The accuracy of the signals on the state s depends on the time the decision maker
spends on gathering information about the state s. The longer the decision maker
spends her time on gathering information about the state s, the more likely she obtains
the signal s = t when the true state  is equal to s, and the more likely she obtains the
signals = f when , s. If thedecisionmaker spendsno timeongathering information
about the state s, namely as = 0, then the signal s is completely uninformative. That
is, Pr(s = tjas = 0; ) = 1=2 for any  2 . The probability distribution of signals is
described below.
Given the state  and a = (a0; a1; a2), signals are independent. The conditional
probability is Pr(s = tja; ) = 1=2 + as for s =  and Pr(s0 = tja; ) = 1=2   as0 for
s0 , . Parameter  2 (0; 1=2) represents the sensitivity of signals. This signal structure
is practical in many situations such as the implementation of a geological survey, an
examination for a certain disease by using test drug, and so on. The signal vector 
realizes with Pr(ja; ) = Pr(0ja; )Pr(1ja; )Pr(2ja; ). Therefore, after choosing an
investigation vector a, the decision maker observes the signal vector  with Pr(ja) =P
2 ()Pr(ja; ).
The decision maker’s payo is given by
uD(p; ; a) =  (p   )2   c
2X
s=0
as;
where the last term represents the total cost of information acquisition and the constant
c > 0 denotes the marginal cost.
The sender’s payo is given by
uS(p; ; b) =  (p      b)2;
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where the bias b > 0 measures howmuch the sender’s interest diers from the decision
maker’s. We assume that b 2 (1=2; 1). Therefore, the most desirable project for the
decision maker is p = , and the most desirable project for the sender is p =  + 1 for
 = 0; 1 and p = 2 for  = 2.
The timing of game is summarized as follows:
1. Nature randomly draws a state  2  with common prior (), and the sender
observes  privately.
2. The decisionmaker chooses investigation vector a, and then she observes a signal
vector  privately. The sender does not observe a and .
3. The sender sends a message m to the decision maker.
4. The decision maker chooses a project p and the game ends.
3.3 Equilibrium Concept
A behavior strategy of the sender,  : ! M, specifies a probability distribution over
the set of messages depending on  2 , where (mj) be the probability with which
the sender of type  sends the message m. Denote by M()  suppf(j)g the set of
messages that the sender’s type  sends with positive probabilities under .
A pure strategy of the decisionmaker, , is defined as a combination of investigation
vector a and a function p(). The function p : A2s=0s M! P specifies a project she
takes for each combination of investigation vector, received signals, and message.
The decision maker’s system of beliefs,  : A  2s=0s  M ! , specifies a
probability distribution over  for each combination of investigation vector, received
signals, and message.
The solution concept we adopt is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium: both players’
strategies are optimal under the given beliefs, and beliefs are derived from Bayes’ rule
whenever possible. The formal definition of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium is given as
follows.
Definition 3.1. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a pair of strategies and a system of
beliefs (ˆ; (aˆ; pˆ); ˆ) that satisfies the following conditions.
1. The sender maximizes his expected payo given the decision maker’s strategy:
for all  2 , if mˆ 2 Mˆ()  suppfˆ(j)g, then
mˆ 2 argmax
m2M
X
22s=0s
Pr(jaˆ; )uS(pˆ(aˆ; ;m); ; b): (3.1)
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2. The decision maker maximizes her expected payo given the sender’s strategy
and the system of beliefs ˆ:
aˆ 2 argmax
a2A
X
2
()
266666664 X
(;m)22s=0sM
Pr(ja; )ˆ(mj)uD(pˆ(a; ;m); ; a)
377777775 ; (3.2)
pˆ(a; ;m) 2 argmax
p2P
X
2
ˆ(ja; ;m)uD(p; ; a) for any (a; ;m) 2 2s=0s M: (3.3)
3. For all a 2 A, all  2 2s=0s and all m 2M,
ˆ(ja; ;m) =
8>>><>>>:
()Pr(ja;)ˆ(mj)P
02 (0)Pr(ja;0)ˆ(mj0) ; if m 2
S
2 Mˆ(),
(); if m <
S
2 Mˆ(),
(3.4)
where () is any distribution over .
Since m <
S
2 Mˆ() is an o-the-path message, we can take any distribution over 
as (). Note that we does not mention the sender’s beliefs that are self-evident.
Hereafter, we call the perfect Bayesian equilibrium simply equilibrium.
3.3.1 Some Properties of Equilibria
In what follows, we derive some results about properties of the equilibrium. First, we
show that there exists no fully separating equilibrium.
Proposition 3.1. There exists no fully separating equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a fully separating equilibrium. Under the fully sep-
arating equilibrium, the decision maker never gather information at stage 2 and she
chooses p = . Then, the expert whose type is  = 0 or 1 has an incentive to deviate
from the truth-telling strategy. This is contradict with the assumption that it is an
equilibrium strategy. 
Given an arbitrary ˆ(ja; ;m), the decision maker’s expected payo produced by
the project p is derived as follows:
  ˆ(1ja; ;m)   4ˆ(2ja; ;m); for p = 0, (3.5)
  ˆ(0ja; ;m)   ˆ(2ja; ;m); for p = 1, (3.6)
  4ˆ(0ja; ;m)   ˆ(1ja; ;m); for p = 2: (3.7)
Therefore, by (3.3), we have the following Fact 3.1 that represents the optimal project
for the decision maker under a given belief.
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Fact 3.1. Given an arbitrary ˆ and arbitrary (a; ;m), the optimal project for the decision maker
is
 pˆ(a; ;m) = 0 if and only if ˆ(0ja; ;m)  ˆ(2ja; ;m) + 12 ,
 pˆ(a; ;m) = 1 if and only if ˆ(2ja; ;m) + 12  ˆ(0ja; ;m)  ˆ(2ja; ;m)   12 ,
 pˆ(a; ;m) = 2 if and only if ˆ(2ja; ;m)   12  ˆ(0ja; ;m).
The project p = 2 is the most desirable project for the sender’s type  = 1 and 2.
Therefore, given aˆ, if there exists a message m˜ such that ˆ(2jaˆ; ; m˜)   1=2 > ˆ(0jaˆ; ; m˜)
for any  2 2s=0s, then the sender can deceive the decision maker into choosing
the project p = 2 by sending message m˜. The following Lemma shows that in any
equilibrium, there does not exist such a message.
Lemma 3.1. For any equilibrium, (ˆ; ˆ; ˆ), there exists no message m˜ such that ˆ(2jaˆ; ; m˜)  
1=2 > ˆ(0jaˆ; ; m˜) for any  2 2s=0s.
Proof. See Appendix 3.B.
The following Lemma 3.2 is induced immediately from Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 3.2. There exists no equilibrium in which there exists m 2M such that m 2 Mˆ(2) and
m < Mˆ(0) [ Mˆ(1).
From Lemma 3.2, we have a fact that that there exists neither fully separating
equilibrium nor partially separating equilibrium in which Mˆ(2) \ fMˆ(0) [ Mˆ(1)g = ;.
Consequently, we have only to consider two kinds of partially separating equilibria.
One is that only the sender of type 0 conveys his type to the decision maker. More
precisely, the sender’s strategy ˆ satisfies that Mˆ(1) = Mˆ(2) and Mˆ(0) \ Mˆ(1) = ;. We
denote by ˆ0 such a strategy. The other is that only the sender of type 1 conveys his type
to the decisionmaker. More precisely, the sender’s strategy ˆ satisfies that Mˆ(0) = Mˆ(2)
and Mˆ(1) \ Mˆ(0) = ;. We denote by ˆ1 such a strategy. Under both ˆ1 and ˆ0, the
sender reveals some information about the state to the decision maker. Suppose that
there exists an equilibrium where the sender’s strategy is ˆ1. The following lemma
shows that under such an equilibrium, messages sent by the sender does not aect the
decision maker’s decision.
Lemma 3.3. In any equilibrium (ˆ; ˆ; ˆ), if there exists a message m1 such that m1 2 Mˆ(1) and
m1 < Mˆ(0) [ Mˆ(2), then pˆ(aˆ; ;m) = 1 for all  2 2s=0s and all m 2 Mˆ(0) [ Mˆ(1) [ Mˆ(2).
Proof. See Appendix 3.C.
This lemma means that under the equilibrium where the sender’s strategy is ˆ1,
messages sent by the sender are meaningless for the decision maker.
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Next section shows the possibility of informative communication equilibria under
which the sender follows the strategy ˆ0 that induces an equilibrium partition as
ff0g; f1; 2gg.
3.4 Benchmark: The Situation where Information Acquisi-
tion is Impossible
In this section, we study the benchmark situation in which the decision maker cannot
acquire information. Namely, the investigation vector is exogenously fixed as a =
(0; 0; 0). Under this assumption, signals do not convey any information to the decision
maker. That is, Pr(s = tja; ) = 1=2 for any  2  and for any s 2 . Therefore,
this setting is essentially correspond to those in CS. Let ˆ be the decision maker’s
equilibrium strategy regarding the project, and ˆ(pjm) denotes the probability that the
decisionmaker chooses the project p after receiving themessagem. We show that in any
equilibrium, messages sent by the sender do not aect the decision maker’s decision.
Proposition 3.2. In any equilibrium, it is satisfied that ˆ(1jm) = 1 for any m 2M.
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.
Proposition 3.2 implies that the sender’s message does not aect the decision
maker’s decision regarding the project when she cannot acquire information about the
state. Let ff0g; f1g; f2gg, ff0g; f1; 2gg, ff0; 1g; f2gg and ff0; 2g; f1gg be partitions of  = f0; 1; 2g.
If the sender’s message strategy induces the partition ff0g; f1g; f2gg, i.e. Mˆ()\Mˆ(0) = ;
for  , 0, then the decision maker chooses p = 0 after learning  = 0, chooses p = 1
after learning  = 1, and chooses p = 2 after learning  = 2, respectively. Then, the
sender’s type  = 0 and 1 have an incentive to deceive the decisionmaker into choosing
p = + 1. Therefore, there is no fully separating equilibrium. Similarly, there is no par-
tially separating equilibrium that induces a equilibrium partition such that ff0g; f1; 2gg
or ff0; 1g; f2gg.
By contrast, there is a partially separating equilibrium under which some infor-
mation is transmitted through the sender’s messages. More precisely, the sender’s
equilibrium strategy induces a partition such that ff0; 2g; f1gg. However, in this equilib-
rium, the decision maker must choose p = 1 after learning  2 f0; 2g.3 Summarizing
the above, Proposition 3.2 implies that the communication between the sender and the
decision maker is useless in this situation.
3Otherwise, the sender’s type  = 0 has an incentive to trick the decision maker into choosing p = 1 by
sending a message that the sender’s type  = 1 sends to the decision maker.
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3.5 Informative Communication under Information Acquisi-
tion
In this section, we provide a necessary and sucient condition for partially informative
separating equilibria. In equilibria, the sender follows the strategy ˆ0 that induces an
equilibrium partition as ff0g; f1; 2gg. In order to avoid confusion, ˆ0 is a pure strategy
where the sender sendsm0 if  = 0 and he sendsm1;2 if  = f1; 2g. This is for the sake of
a simplification for discussion. Even if we consider mixed strategies, the results are not
changed at all. We show that there are two types of equilibria where the sender follows
ˆ0. In one of them, the decision maker spends all her time on investigating whether
state 1 is realized or not, that is, aˆ1 = (0; 1; 0). In the other, she spends all her time on
investigating whether state 2 is realized or not, that is, aˆ2 = (0; 0; 1).
First, in Proposition 3.3, we provide a necessary and sucient condition for the
former type of equilibria to be exist. Second, in Proposition 3.4, we provide a necessary
and sucient condition for the latter type of equilibria to be exist.
Proposition 3.3. There exists a partially separating equilibrium, (ˆ0; (aˆ1; pˆ); ˆ), if and only if
q > c; and (3.8)
  max
(
1
2
  q   c
1   q ;
6b   5
2(3   2b)
)
: (3.9)
In this equilibrium (ˆ0; (aˆ1; pˆ); ˆ), after receiving m0, the decision maker always
chooses p = 0. after receiving m1;2, the decision maker chooses p = 1 if she observes
1 = t, and she chooses p = 2 if she observes 1 = f . It is obvious that the sender of
type 1 and 2 has no incentive to deviate from m1;2 to m0. The sender of type 0 obtains
 b2 by sending m0, and obtains
Pr(1 = tja1 = 1;  = 0)f (1   b)2g + [1   Pr(1 = tja1 = 1;  = 0)]f (2   b)2g:
If Pr(1 = tja1 = 1;  = 0) is small enough, then
 b2 Pr(1 = tja1 = 1;  = 0)f (1   b)2g
+ [1   Pr(1 = tja1 = 1;  = 0)]f (2   b)2g: (3.10)
This implies that the sender of type  = 0 has no incentive to deviate from m0 to m1;2.
The inequality (3.10) can be simplified into   6b 52(3 2b) . This inequality corresponds
to the equilibrium condition (3.1). This implies that must be high enough for the truth-
telling of the sender’s type  = 0 to be incentive compatible for him. The sender’s type
 = 0 gets to hate the project p = 2 as b becomes smaller. Therefore, the deviation
incentive of the sender’s type  = 0 becomes smaller as b becomes smaller.
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The condition   12   q c1 q in (3.9) is induced by the equilibrium condition (3.2).
This implies that  must be large enough for the decision maker not to neglect the
information acquisition. If q is close to 1=3, then the prior distribution has no precision.
In such a situation, the value of additional information that the information acquisition
provides for the decision maker is high. If c is small enough, then the decision maker
can acquire information readily.
Before we prove the proposition, we characterize the relation between the decision
maker’s information acquisition and the decision regarding the the project under the
partition equilibrium where the sender follows ˆ0.
Given an investigationvector a and receivingm0, thedecisionmaker’s belief satisfies
that ˆ(0ja; ;m0) = 1 for any  2 2s=0s. Therefore, the optimal project for the decision
maker is pˆ(a; ;m0) = 0.
Given an investigation vector a and receiving m1;2, by the condition (3.4), we have
ˆ(1ja; ;m1;2) = (1)Pr(1ja1; 1)Pr(2ja2; 1)
(1)Pr(2ja2; 1)Pr(2ja2; 1) + (2)Pr(1ja1; 2)Pr(2ja1; 2)
where ˆ(1ja; ;m1;2)+ˆ(2ja; ;m1;2) = 1. Hence, the decisionmaker obtains ˆ(2ja; ;m1;2)
by choosing the project 1, and obtains  ˆ(1ja; ;m1;2) by choosing the project 2. The
equilibrium conditions (3.3) induces the following lemma.
Lemma 3.4. Given ˆ0 and (a; ;m1;2), the optimal project for the decision maker satisfies that
if
Pr(1ja; 1)Pr(2ja; 1)
Pr(1ja; 2)Pr(2ja; 2) 
(2)
(1)
; then pˆ(a; ;m1;2) = 1;
if
Pr(1ja; 1)Pr(2ja; 1)
Pr(1ja; 2)Pr(2ja; 2) 
(2)
(1)
; then pˆ(a; ;m1;2) = 2;
To simplify the notation, we define A1  1+2a11 2a1 and A2 
1+2a2
1 2a2 . For each s 2 f1; 2g, es
is strictly increasing in as. Since, moreover, 0  as  1 and Ps=0 as  1, the feasible set
of (A1;A2) is
A1;2 
(
(A1;A2) : A1;A2 2
"
1;
1 + 2
1   2
#
and A1  1 + (1 + A2)A2   (1 + A2)
)
:
Lemma 3.4 shows that givenm1;2 and (1; 2), the optimal project for the decisionmaker
is derived as follows.
 For (1; 2) = (t; t), the optimal project for the decision maker is
pˆ(a; ;m1;2) =
8>>><>>>:1 for f(A1;A2) 2 A1;2 : A1=A2  (2)=(1)g;2 for f(A1;A2) 2 A1;2 : A1=A2  (2)=(1)g: (3.11)
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 For (1; 2) = ( f ; f ), the optimal project for the decision maker is
pˆ(a; ;m1;2) =
8>>><>>>:1 for f(A1;A2) 2 A1;2 : A1=A2  (1)=(2)g;2 for f(A1;A2) 2 A1;2 : A1=A2  (1)=(2)g: (3.12)
 For (1; 2) = (t; f ), the optimal project for the decision maker is
pˆ(a; ;m1;2) =
8>>><>>>:1 for f(A1;A2) 2 A1;2 : A1A2  (2)=(1)g;2 for f(A1;A2) 2 A1;2 : A1A2  (2)=(1)g: (3.13)
 For (1; 2) = ( f ; t), the optimal project for the decision maker is
pˆ(a; ;m1;2) =
8>>><>>>:1 for f(A1;A2) 2 A1;2 : A1A2  (1)=(2)g;2 for f(A1;A2) 2 A1;2 : A1A2  (1)=(2)g: (3.14)
If (1   2)=(1 + 2) > (2)=(1), then pˆ(a; ;m1;2) = 1 for any (1; 2). Therefore, it
must be satisfied that (1   2)=(1 + 2)  (2)=(1). This inequality can be simplified
into
 >
1
2
  q
1   2q : (3.15)
Summarizing the above conditions (3.11)–(3.15), we have the following Figure 3.1.
By using Lemma 3.4, we now show Proposition 3.3. Lemma 3.4 completes the full
characterization of ˆ and ˆ(a; ;m) under given ˆ0. The decision maker’s maximization
problem is as follows:
max
a
(a)  (0)  0 + (1)
h
(1=2 + a1)(1=2   a2)f (pˆ(a; (t; t);m1;2)   1)2g
+ (1=2   a1)(1=2 + a2)f (pˆ(a; ( f ; f );m1;2)   1)2g
+ (1=2 + a1)(1=2 + a2)f (pˆ(a; (t; f );m1;2)   1)2g
+ (1=2   a1)(1=2   a2)f (pˆ(a; ( f ; t);m1;2)   1)2g
i
+ (2)
h
(1=2   a1)(1=2 + a2)f (pˆ(a; (t; t);m1;2)   2)2g
+ (1=2 + a1)(1=2   a2)f (pˆ(a; ( f ; f );m1;2)   2)2g
+ (1=2   a1)(1=2   a2)f (pˆ(a; (t; f );m1;2)   2)2g
+ (1=2 + a1)(1=2 + a2)f (pˆ(a; ( f ; t);m1;2)   2)2g
i
  c
2X
s=0
as:
Obviously, it must be satisfied that aˆ0 = 0.
66 3. Communication Enhancement through Information Acquisition
-
6
A20
A1








(3:11)

















(3:12)
(3:14)
1 1+2
1 2
1
1+2
1 2
A˜3
A˜4
A˜1
A˜2
Figure 3.1: q1 2q 2
 1 2
1+2 ; 1

In the region A˜1,
(a)  (0)  0   (1)
h
(1=2   a1)(1=2 + a2) + (1=2   a1)(1=2   a2)
i
  (2)
h
(1=2   a1)(1=2 + a2) + (1=2   a1)(1=2   a2)
i
  c(a1 + a2)
=   (1   q)(1=2   a1)   c(a1 + a2):
If   c=(1   q), then (a) is maximized at aˆ1 = (0; 1; 0) in the region A˜1, and (aˆ) =
 (1   q)=2 + (1   q)   c. Otherwise, (a) is decreasing in a1 and a2. This implies that
the solution of the above maximizing problem must not belong to the region A˜1 when
 < c=(1   q).
In the region A˜2,
(a)  (0)  0   (1)
h
(1=2 + a1)(1=2   a2) + (1=2   a1)(1=2   a2)
i
  (2)
h
(1=2 + a1)(1=2   a2) + (1=2   a1)(1=2   a2)
i
  c(a1 + a2)
=   (1   q)(1=2   a2)   c(a1 + a2):
If   c=(1   q), then (a) is maximized at aˆ2 = (0; 0; 1) in the region A˜2, and (aˆ2) =
(aˆ) =  1 q2 + (1   q)   c. Otherwise, (a) is decreasing in a1 and a2. This implies that
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the solution of the above maximizing problem must not belong to the region A˜2 when
 < c=(1   q).
In the region A˜3,
(a) (0)  0   (1)  0
  (2)
h
(1=2   a1)(1=2 + a2) + (1=2 + a1)(1=2   a2)
+ (1=2   a1)(1=2   a2) + (1=2 + a1)(1=2 + a2)
i
  c(a1 + a2)
=   q   c(a1 + a2):
Therefore, (a) is maximized at a0 = (0; 0; 0) in the region A˜3, and (a0) =  q.
In the region A˜4,
(a) (0)  0   (1)(1=2   a1)(1=2   a2)
  (2)
h
(1=2   a1)(1=2 + a2) + (1=2 + a1)(1=2   a2)
+ (1=2   a1)(1=2   a2)
i
  c(a1 + a2)
=   2a1a2(1   3q) + (1   q)(a1 + a2)=2   1=2   c(a1 + a2):
Suppose that(a) is maximized at a00 on the boundaries (3.11), (3.12) and (3.14). As
mentioned above,(a) is nevermaximized at a00 in each region A˜1, A˜2 and A˜3. Hence, if
a00 is on the boundaries (3.11), (3.12) and (3.14), then a00 is not a solution of the decision
maker’s maximization problem. Therefore, we have only to make sure that whether
a00 = (0; a; a) 2 A˜4 can be the solution of the above maximizing problem. By choosing
a00, the decision maker obtains
(a00) =  2a2(1   3q) + a(1   q)   1=2   2ac:
Let a = (0; 2a; 0). By choosing a, the decision maker obtains
(a)   (1   q)(1=2   2a)   2ac > (a00):
This implies that the solution of the decision maker’s maximization problem must not
belong to A˜4.
Now suppose that  < c=(1   q). Then, (a) is maximized at a0 = (0; 0; 0). In this
case, the decision maker always chooses pˆ = 1 after receiving m1;2. Hence, the sender
of type  = 0 has an incentive to cheat the decision maker to choose pˆ = 1 after sending
m1;2. Therefore it must be satisfied that   c=(1   q).
Next suppose that   c=(1   q). In this case, there are three candidates of the
solution of the decision maker’s maximizing problem, that is, a0 = (0; 0; 0), aˆ1 = (0; 1; 0)
and aˆ2 = (0; 0; 1). Note that (aˆ1) = (aˆ2) In the given equilibrium, the investigation
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vector must not be a0 = (0; 0; 0). Therefore, it must be satisfied that (aˆ1)  (a0).
Hence, we have the following necessary condition (3.16).
  1
2
  q   c
1   q : (3.16)
Since  < 1=2, we have the following necessary condition (3.17).
q > c: (3.17)
Moreover, we can conclude that the equilibrium investigation vector must be aˆ1 or aˆ2.
Next we consider the sender’s incentive compatibility condition in the given strat-
egy profile. By the construction of ˆ0, it is obvious that the sender’s type  = 1 and
2 has no incentive to deviate from the given strategy. After receiving m0, the decision
maker chooses the project pˆ = 0 regardless of . Therefore, the sender’s type  = 0
obtains  b2 by sending m0. Lemma 3.4 shows that pˆ(aˆ1; ;m1;2) satisfies that
pˆ(aˆ1; ;m1;2) =
8>>><>>>:1 for 1 = t;2 for 1 = f : (3.18)
Therefore, the sender’s type  = 0 obtains (1=2 )(1 b)2  (1=2+)(2 b)2 by sending
m1;2. The equilibrium condition (3.1) requires that  b2   (1=2 )(1 b)2  (1=2+)(2 
b)2:Hence, we have the following necessary condition (3.19).
  6b   5
2(3   2b) : (3.19)
The necessary condition for the sender’s incentive compatibility is (3.19). Summa-
rizing the above, we obtain necessary conditions for the equilibrium (ˆ0; (aˆ1; pˆ); ˆ) to be
exist as (3.8)–(3.9).
Finally, we sow that (3.8)–(3.9) are sucient conditions for the equilibrium to be
exist. We have already shown that if (3.8) holds, then the decision maker has no
incentive to deviate from (aˆ1; pˆ) by taking aˆ1 = (0; 1; 0) and pˆ satisfies Lemma 3.4.
Moreover, we have also sown that if (3.9) holds, then the sender of type  = 0 has no
incentive to deviate from m0 to m1;2, and the sender of type  = 1; 2 has no incentive
to deviate from m1;2 to m0. Hence, we have only to make sure that the sender has no
incentive to deviate from the given message strategy to m˜ 2 M n fm0;m1;2g. Since m˜ is
o the equilibrium path message, we can take ˆ(ja; ; m˜) as an arbitrary probability
distribution. Take ˆ(ja; ; m˜) such as ˆ(ja; ; m˜) = ˆ(ja; ;m1;2). Then, the decision
maker’s behavior after receiving m˜ coincides with that after receiving m1;2. Hence, the
sender has no incentive to deviate from the given message strategy. This completes the
proof.
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In the equilibrium we constructed above, the decision maker spends all her time on
investigation whether state 1 is realized or not, that is, aˆ = (0; 1; 0). We can consider
the equilibriumwhere the decisionmaker spends all her time on investigation whether
state 2 is realized or not. Next we provide a necessary and sucient condition for a
partially separating equilibrium where aˆ2 = (0; 1; 0) to be exist.
Proposition 3.4. There exists a partially separating equilibrium, (ˆ0; (aˆ2; ˆ); ˆ), if and only if
2q + 1   3c
2(1   c) > b and  2
 
1
2
  q   c
1   q ;
5   6b
2(3   2b)
!
: (3.20)
Lemma 3.4 shows that pˆ(aˆ2; ;m1;2) satisfies that
pˆ(aˆ2; ;m1;2) =
8>>><>>>:1 for 2 = f ;2 for 2 = t: (3.21)
In this equilibrium (ˆ0; (aˆ2; pˆ); ˆ), after receiving m0, the decision maker always
chooses p = 0. after receiving m1;2, the decision maker chooses p = 1 if she observes
2 = f , and she chooses p = 2 if she observes 2 = t. It is obvious that the sender of
type 1 and 2 has no incentive to deviate from m1;2 to m0. The sender of type 0 obtains
 b2 by sending m0, and obtains
Pr(2 = f ja2 = 1;  = 0)f (1   b)2g + [1   Pr(2 = f ja2 = 1;  = 0)]f (2   b)2g:
If Pr(2 = f ja2 = 1;  = 0) is small enough, then
 b2 Pr(2 = f ja2 = 1;  = 0)f (1   b)2g
+ [1   Pr(2 = f ja2 = 1;  = 0)]f (2   b)2g: (3.22)
This implies that the sender of type  = 0 has no incentive to deviate from m0 to m1;2.
The inequality (3.22) can be simplified into   5 6b2(3 2b) . This inequality corresponds
to the equilibrium condition (3.1). This requires that b is small. The sender’s type  = 0
gets to hate the project p = 2 as b becomes smaller. Therefore, the deviation incentive
of the sender’s type  = 0 becomes smaller as b becomes smaller.
The condition   12   q c1 q in (3.9) is induced by the equilibrium condition (3.2). This
implies thatmust be large enough for thedecisionmakernot toneglect the information
acquisition. A comparing (3.20) shows that thedecisionmaker’s incentive compatibility
condition remains unaected by the dierence between two investigation vectors, aˆ1 =
(0; 1; 0) and aˆ2 = (0; 0; 1). This implies that the value of additional information that
aˆ1 = (0; 1; 0) provides for the decision maker is equivalent to that aˆ2 = (0; 0; 1) provides
for her.
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On the other hand, the sender’s incentive compatibility condition is aected by
the dierence between two investigation vectors, aˆ1 = (0; 1; 0) and aˆ2 = (0; 0; 1). Since
 > 6b 52(3 2b) whenever  <
5 6b
2(3 2b) , the condition (3.20) is more restrictive than the condi-
tion (3.9). This results from the dierence between the decision maker’s equilibrium
decision after receiving m1;2 2 M1;2. Under the equilibrium where aˆ1 = (0; 1; 0), after
receiving m1;2, the decision maker chooses p = 1 when 1 = t, and chooses p = 2 when
1 = f . By contrast, under the equilibrium where aˆ2 = (0; 0; 1), after receiving m1;2, the
decision maker chooses p = 1 when 2 = f , and chooses p = 2 when 2 = t. Recall that
(3.10) and (3.22). Since Pr(2 = f ja2 = 1;  = 0) > 1=2 > Pr(1 = tja1 = 1;  = 0), we have
Pr(2 = f ja2 = 1;  = 0)f (1   b)2g + [1   Pr(2 = f ja2 = 1;  = 0)]f (2   b)2g
> Pr(1 = tja1 = 1;  = 0)f (1   b)2g + [1   Pr(1 = tja1 = 1;  = 0)]f (2   b)2g:
That is the reason why the condition (3.20) is more restrictive than the condition (3.9).
3.6 Discussion
The decision maker’s ex ante expected payo under the equilibrium in Proposition 3.3
(and Proposition 3.4) is(aˆ) =   1 q2 + (1  q)  c, whereas the decision maker’s ex ante
expected payo under the equilibriumwhen she cannot acquire additional information
is  2q. Since   12   q c1 q , we have (aˆ) >  2q. This shows that the decision maker can
obtain higher expected payo in the equilibrium where she gathers information than
that in the equilibrium where she does not gather information.
Interestingly, the decision maker’s information acquisition can be profitable for
herself even when the precision of the investigation activities is low, namely  is small.
To simplify the explanation, we consider the case where q is close to 1=3, c is close to 0
and b < 5=6. Under this assumption, we can take  close to 0. Precisely, there exists a
positive number4 "(q; c) such that for all  2 ("(q; c); 1=2), the condition (3:9) holds.
Now, we suppose that  is small enough in the interval ("(q; c); 1=2). Then, the
eect of signals on the decision maker’s belief is small. Therefore, the information
acquisition provides little additional information about the state for the decisionmaker.
Nevertheless, the decision maker’s ex ante expected payo under the equilibrium
where she acquire additional informationdiers vastly from the ex ante expectedpayo
when she cannot acquire additional information: (aˆ)   ( 2q)  1=3. This results from
the fact that the decision maker’s information acquisition facilitates communication.
When thedecisionmakerdoesnot acquire additional information, she fails choosing
the most desirable project with the probability (0) + (2) = 2=3 and suers a loss that
4This positive number, "(q; c), goes to 0 as q goes to 1=3 and c goes to 0.
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will be 1. However, under the equilibrium in Proposition 3.3, the sender’s type  = 0
reports that “his type is  = 0”. Hence, the decision maker can prevent a failure
of the project when the true state is  = 0. That is the reason why the decision
maker’s information acquisition can facilitate communication drastically even when
the precision of the investigation activities is low.
Finally, we discuss robustness of the equilibrium with respect to the timing of
information acquisition by the decisionmaker. Consider a situation where the decision
maker canacquireprivate information after receivingmessage from the sender. Under
such a situation, if the parameters satisfy the condition in Proposition 3.3, then there
also exists a partially “informative” separating equilibrium that induce an equilibrium
partition ff0g; f1; 2gg. Under this equilibrium, the decision maker acquire additional
information onlywhen the sender reveals that belongs to f1; 2g. This contribute to cost
reduction since the decisionmaker need not to acquire additional informationwhen the
sender reveals that  = 0. Moreover, this economizing of information acquisition by the
decision maker does not aect the sender’s incentive since his incentive compatibility
condition holds as long as the decision maker acquire additional information when he
reveals that  belongs to f1; 2g. The degree of cost reduction is (0)  c = qc. However,
under the situation where c is small, this cost reduction hardly aects the ex ante
expected payo of the decision maker. This implies that communication enhancement
through information acquisition by the decision maker is robust with respect to its
timing.
Appendix
Appendix 3.A Proof of Proposition 3.1
We denote by ˆ(jm) the decision maker’s belief after receiving the message m. We
prove Proposition 1 by three step. First, we show the following Fact 3.2.
Fact 3.2. Let an equilibrium be fixed arbitrarily. Then,
@m 2M; s:t: ˆ(0jm) > 0 and ˆ(2jm) > 0:
Proof of Fact 3.2. After receiving a message m and choosing a project p, the decision
maker’s expected payo is derived as follows:
  ˆ(1jm)   4ˆ(2jm); if p = 0, (3.23)
  ˆ(0jm)   ˆ(2jm); if p = 1, (3.24)
  ˆ(1jm)   4ˆ(0jm); if p = 2. (3.25)
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If ˆ(0jm) > 0 and ˆ(2jm) > 0, then it must be satisfied that
 ˆ(1jm)   4ˆ(2jm) =  ˆ(1jm)   4ˆ(0jm):
Obviously, if this equation holds, then the following inequality holds.
 ˆ(0jm)   ˆ(2jm) >  ˆ(1jm)   4ˆ(2jm) =  ˆ(1jm)   4ˆ(0jm):
This is incompatible with the given strategy profile is an equilibrium. 
Second, we show the following Fact 3.3.
Fact 3.3. Let an equilibrium be fixed arbitrarily. Then,
@m 2M; s:t: ˆ(2jm) > 0:
Proof of Fact 3.3. Let M˜ be the set of messages such that the sender sends with positive
probabilities and ˆ(2jm) > 0 for m 2 M˜. Suppose that M˜ , ;. If all messages that
the sender’s type  = 1 sends with positive probabilities belong to M˜, since (1) >
(2), then there exists a message m˜ 2 M˜ such that ˆ(1jm˜) > ˆ(2jm˜). Then, we have
 ˆ(0jm˜)   ˆ(2jm˜) >  ˆ(1jm˜)   4ˆ(0jm˜). This implies that the decision maker strictly
prefers p = 1 to p = 2 after receiving the message m˜. Therefore, the sender’s type  = 1
must choose m0 < M˜ with positive probabilities. Because of the definition of M˜ and
Fact 1, it must be satisfied that
ˆ(2jm) > 0; ˆ(1jm)  0 and ˆ(0jm) = 0 for all m 2 M˜:
On the other hand, it must be satisfied that
ˆ(2jm0) = 0; ˆ(1jm0)  0 and ˆ(0jm0)  0:
Therefore, under the given decision maker’s strategy ˆ, the sender’s type  = 1 strictly
prefers m 2 M˜ to m0. Nevertheless, under the given strategy, the sender’s type  = 1
sendsm0with positive probabilities. This is incompatiblewith the given strategy profile
is an equilibrium.
Next, we show that the decision maker never chooses p = 2 with positive prob-
abilities even o the equilibrium path. Let m be the o-the-path message such that
ˆ(2jm) > 0. Because of Fact 1, it must be satisfied that
ˆ(2jm) > 0; ˆ(1jm)  0 and ˆ(0jm) = 0:
Since receiver never chooses p = 2 on the equilibrium path, the sender’s type  = 1
strictly prefers m to any message that he sends with positive probabilities under the
given strategy. Therefore, there must not existsm. This completes the proof of Fact 3.3.

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Finally, we show the following Fact 3.4
Fact 3.4. Let an equilibrium be fixed arbitrarily. Then, it must be satisfied that ˆ(0jm) = 0 for
any m that occurs with positive probabilities on the equilibrium path.
Proof of Fact 3.4. Let Mˆ be the set of messages such that the sender sends with positive
probabilities and ˆ(0jmˆ) > 0 for mˆ 2 Mˆ. Suppose that Mˆ , ;. If all messages that
the sender’s type  = 1 sends with positive probabilities belong to Mˆ, since (1) >
(2), then there exists a message mˆ 2 Mˆ such that ˆ(1jmˆ) > ˆ(0jmˆ). Then, we have
 ˆ(0jmˆ)   ˆ(2jmˆ) >  ˆ(1jmˆ)   4ˆ(2jmˆ). This implies that the decision maker strictly
prefers p = 1 to p = 0 after receiving the message mˆ. Therefore, the sender’s type  = 1
must choose some m00 < Mˆ with positive probabilities. Because of the definition of Mˆ
and Fact 2, it must be satisfied that ˆ(1jm00) = 1. On the other hand, because of the
definition of Mˆ and Fact 1, it must be satisfied that
ˆ(0jmˆ) > 0; ˆ(1jmˆ)  0 and ˆ(2jmˆ) = 0:
Therefore, under the given decision maker’s strategy ˆ, the sender’s type  = 0 strictly
prefers m00 to mˆ 2 Mˆ. Nevertheless, under the given strategy, the sender’s type  = 0
sends mˆwith positive probabilities. This is incompatible with the given strategy profile
is an equilibrium. ^ Fact 3.2–3.4 completes the proof of Proposition 1. 
Appendix 3.B Proof of Lemma 3.1
Suppose that there exists such a message m˜. Then, given aˆ and after receiving m˜, the
decision maker must choose the project pˆ(aˆ; ; m˜) = 2 regardless of . Since, moreover,
(1)Pr(jaˆ; 1) > (2)Pr(jaˆ; 2) for  = (0; t; f ), it must satisfied that ˆ(m˜j2) > ˆ(m˜j1).
This implies that there exists a message m0 , m˜ such that ˆ(m0j1) > ˆ(m0j2). Given m0,
aˆ and , the decision maker’s beliefs are derived:
ˆ(jaˆ; ;m0) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
(1)Pr(jaˆ;1)ˆ(m0j1)P
02 (0)Pr(jaˆ;0)ˆ(m0j0) ; if  = 1,
(2)Pr(jaˆ;2)ˆ(m0j2)P
02 (0)Pr(jaˆ;0)ˆ(m0j0) ; if  = 2,
1   ˆ(1jaˆ; ;m0)   ˆ(2jaˆ; ;m0) if  = 0.
(3.26)
Since (1) > (2) and Pr(jaˆ; 1) > Pr(jaˆ; 2) for  = (0; t; f ), after receiving  = (0; t; f )
and m0, the decision maker’s beliefs satisfy that ˆ(1jaˆ; ;m0) > ˆ(2jaˆ; ;m0). Therefore,
the sender cannot cause the decision maker to choose the project p = 2 with probability
1 by sending the message m0. Now, the message m0 belongs to Mˆ(1). Obviously, this is
incompatible with (3.1). ^
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Appendix 3.C Proof of Lemma 3.3
Consider an equilibrium in which there exists a message m1 such that m1 2 Mˆ(1) and
m1 < Mˆ(0) [ Mˆ(2). Then, after receiving m1, the optimal project for decision maker
pˆ(aˆ; ;m1) is 1 regardless of the signals.
First, we now suppose that there existsm0 2 Mˆ(0)[Mˆ(1)[Mˆ(2) such that pˆ(aˆ; ;m0) =
0 for some  2 2s=0s. By Lemma 1, m0 must belongs to Mˆ(0). Obviously, this is
incompatible with (3.1).
Second, we suppose that there existsm2 2 Mˆ(0)[Mˆ(1)[Mˆ(2) such that pˆ(aˆ; ;m2) = 2
for some  2 2s=0s. If there does not exists  such that pˆ(aˆ; ;m2) = 0, then the sender’s
type  = 1 strictly prefers m2 to m1. Therefore, it must be satisfied that pˆ(aˆ; ;m2) = 0
for some  2 2s=0s. Moreover, by Lemma 1, m2 must belongs to Mˆ(0). This is
incompatible with (3.1). ^
4
Timing of Communication under Information
Gathering
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we study a model where the expert’s private information is partial and
the receiver chooses whether to conduct an investigation and the timing of communi-
cation ( i.e., either before or after the investigation). We show that the decision maker’s
investigation can facilitate communication and that the timing of communication can
be essential for communication enhancement. Our main finding is that under some
conditions, the decision maker can elicit the expert’s private information by seeking
advice after conducting the investigation, whereas she cannot elicit it by seeking advice
before the investigation.1
The situation we consider is as follows. A decision maker (she) has to choose a
project. The revenue from the project depends on the state. She does not know the true
state, but she can collect information about the state by conducting an investigation and
communicating with an expert. Conducting an investigation (e.g., market research) is
costly and time consuming. Therefore, its timing is fixed and the decision maker can
conduct it only once. By contrast, the decision maker can easily seek advice from an
expert (him) who has partial information about the state. Hence, she can choose the
timingof communication ( i.e., either before or after the investigation) and communicate
with the expert without any cost. We assume that there is no ex post incentive conflict
between the decision maker and expert. In other words, when the state is common
knowledge, the expert’s preference over projects coincides with that of the decision
maker.
When conducting the investigation is costless, it is always optimal for the decision
maker to conduct the investigation. Therefore, the timing of communication does not
aect information transmission. If conducting the investigation is costly, one would
think that by seeking advice in advance, the decision maker could reduce the expected
1In the previous chapter, we examined amodelwhere the expert has perfect information about the state
and showed that communication enhancement through information acquisition by the decision maker is
robust with respect to its timing.
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cost of the investigation from the ex ante viewpoint since she could choose not to
conduct the investigation depending on the advice. At first glance, it seems that
seeking advice before deciding whether to conduct the investigation is optimal for the
decision maker. This chapter shows that the above conjecture is not always correct.
We elucidate the relation between the timing of the investigation and communication
timing, and show that (i) the decision maker’s investigation facilitates communication
and (ii) this depends on the timing of communication, namely the timing of information
transmission (before or after the investigation) could be critical for eliciting informative
message.
Our analysis builds on a sender–receiver game where both the expert (sender) and
the decision maker (receiver) are partially informed. In our model, the decision maker
has an alternative source of information about the state. Some recent works have
examined the nature of strategic information transmission where the decision maker is
partially informed about the state. Among them, this chapter is most closely related to
Ishida and Shimizu (2015) andWatson (1996). These two studies ezamine models with
a partially informed expert and provide the conditions for fully revealing equilibria to
exist.2
The key factor of the truth-telling in the situation where both the expert and the
decision maker have imperfect information is as follows. Consider the case where the
more informed the decision maker becomes, the more she is able to make a desirable
decision for both the expert and thedecisionmaker from the viewpoint of their expected
payos. Then, the expert is willing to convey his private information to ensure that the
decision maker makes a decision based on accurate information.
On the one hand, Ishida and Shimizu (2015) and Watson (1996) examine models
where the decision maker’s private information is derived exogenously. On the other
hand, in our model, the decision maker’s private information is derived depending
on whether she conducts a costly investigation. Hence, the expert conveys his private
information while being careful about the possibility that the decision maker does
not conduct the investigation. Therefore, in our model, the expert may convey his
private information if and only if the decision maker asks the expert for advice after
the investigation.
To understand why the expert might not convey his private information before
the decision maker’s investigation, consider the situation where the decision maker
2Chen (2009), Chen (2012), Ishida and Shimizu (2016), Lai (2014), and Moreno de Barreda (2013)
consider cases with a perfectly informed expert and imperfectly informed decision maker. In each of
these models, the decision maker’s private signal is distributed with a given prior probability. By contrast,
in our model, the decision maker’s private signal is induced by her strategic investigation. Morgan and
Stocken (2008) and Galeotti et al. (2013) consider models with multiple imperfectly informed experts.
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decides whether to conduct the investigation after seeking advice from the expert.
As noted earlier, if conducting the investigation is costly for the decision maker, then
she might not do it in order to save costs. In such a situation, the expert might
be exposed to risk by truth-telling because the decision maker might choose a risky
project without conducting an investigation. As a result, the expert has an incentive to
deceive and withhold information to prevent the decision maker from choosing such
a risky project. This prevents informative communication. Our main finding is that
under some conditions, the decision maker can elicit the expert’s private information
by seeking advice after conducting an investigation.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we explain our
model. In Section 4.3 and 4.4, we characterize the optimal project for players under
the given information. In Section 4.5, we study the benchmark model in which the
decision maker cannot acquire information. We show that under certain conditions,
only uninformative equilibria exist in this setting. In Section 4.6.2, we show how
the decision maker’s investigation facilitates communication. We also provide the
necessary and sucient condition for the existence of a fully separating equilibrium.
In Section 4.7, we discuss the results in Section 4.6.2.
4.2 Model
A decision maker (d or she) of an organization has to choose a project p 2 P  fL; S;Rg.
A payo for the decision maker depends on the state as well as the chosen project.
Let  be the state, which is distributed on   fl; rg. We assume that the decision
maker has no information about the state in advance. In other words, she has prior
information that the states are realized with equal probabilities. The decision maker’s
payo function, Ud : P ! R, is defined as follows:
[Ud(p; )] 
0BBBBBBBBB@
Ud(L; l) Ud(L; r)
Ud(S; l) Ud(S; r)
Ud(R; l) Ud(R; r)
1CCCCCCCCCA
=
0BBBBBBBBB@
0  Ar
 1  1
 Al 0
1CCCCCCCCCA ;
where A > 2 for each .
If  is observable, then the most profitable project for the decision maker is the
extreme project (L or R); if  = l, then she prefers L to S and R. Otherwise, she prefers
R to S and L. Since the decision maker has no information about the state in advance,
she prefers the status quo (S) to extreme projects under the given prior probability.
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The decision maker can gather information by conducting an investigation at cost
C > 0. If the decision maker gathers information, then she observes an imperfect signal
y 2 Y  fyl; yrg privately. The information structure that generates y is defined as
follows:
[Pr(yj)] 
0BBBB@ Pr(yljl) Pr(yljr)Pr(yrjl) Pr(yrjr)
1CCCCA
=
0BBBB@ 1     1   
1CCCCA ;
where 1=2 >  > 0. If she does not gather information, then she observes  with
probability one.
We denote by  2 f0; 1g the decision maker’s action regarding the investigation.
The symbol  = 1 means that she gathers information at cost C. Let Y  Y [ fg be the
set of the decision maker’s private signals. The symbol y 2 Y means that she gathers
information at cost C and observes a signal y. The symbol  = 0 means that she does
not gather information and observes a meaningless signal y = . The overall payo
for the decision maker is defined as Ud(p; )     C.
In addition to gathering y, the decision maker can ask an informed expert (e or he)
for advice. We suppose that the expert observes a signal x 2 X  fxl; xrg privately. The
information structure that generates x is defined as follows:
[Pr(xj)] 
0BBBB@ Pr(xljl) Pr(xljr)Pr(xrjl) Pr(xrjr)
1CCCCA
=
0BBBB@ 1   ˆ ˆˆ 1   ˆ
1CCCCA ;
where 1=2 > ˆ > 0 for each . To simplify the analysis, we assume that x and y are
independent and that the probability of signal x and the probability of signal y are
the same for each state:  = ˆ.
The expert obtains a private benefit depending on the implemented project. Let
Ue : P ! R be the payo function of the expert:
[Ue(p; )] 
0BBBBBBBBB@
Ue(L; l) Ue(L; r)
Ue(S; l) Ue(S; r)
Ue(R; l) Ue(R; r)
1CCCCCCCCCA
=
0BBBBBBBBB@
0  Br
 1  1
 Bl 0
1CCCCCCCCCA ;
where B > 2.
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If the state is observable, he prefers the extreme project corresponding to  just
as the decision maker does. More precisely, if  = l, then she prefers L to S and R.
Otherwise, she prefers R to S and L.
Weassume that the timingof thedecisionmaker’s investigation is fixed. Asopposed
to the investigation, we assume that the decision maker can choose the timing of
communication and that the timing of communication is observable for the expert.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Nature randomly draws a state  2  with probability 1=2 each, and the expert
observes a signal x 2 X privately.
2. The decision maker chooses the timing of communication; she asks for advice
before or after the investigation.
3. If the decisionmaker asks for advice before the investigation, then the expert sends
a message m1 2 X to the decision maker depending on x at this stage.
4. The decision maker chooses  2 f0; 1g, and then, she observes a signal y 2 Y 
Y [ fg. We assume that both  and y are unobservable for the expert.
5. If the decision maker asks for advice after the investigation, then the expert sends
a message m2 2 X to the decision maker depending on x.
6. The decision maker chooses a project p 2 P and the game ends.
We solve the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the model to analyze (i) the comple-
mentarity between communication and the decision maker’s investigation and (ii) the
importance of the timing of communication. We focus on the pure strategy perfect
Bayesian equilibrium, called equilibrium henceforth.
4.3 Optimal Project for Players Given Beliefs
First, we characterize the optimal project for players under a give belief. Let i be an
arbitrary player i’s belief with which the state l is realized. Under this belief, the i’s
expected payo from project p is as follows:
Ee[Ue(p; )] =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
 (1   e)Br for p = L;
 1 for p = S;
 eBl for p = R:
(4.1)
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Ed[U
d(p; )] =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
 (1   d)Ar for p = L;
 1 for p = S;
 dAl for p = R:
(4.2)
Therefore, under the given belief i, the i’s optimal project pˆi(i) is defined as follows:
pˆi(i) 2 argmax
p2P Ei[U
i(p; )]: (4.3)
We have the following Fact 4.1.
Fact 4.1.
pˆe(e) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
L if (Br   1)=Br  e;
S if 1=Bl  e  (Br   1)=Br;
R if e  1=Bl:
(4.4)
pˆd(d) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
L if (Ar   1)=Ar  d;
S if 1=Al  d  (Ar   1)=Ar;
R if d  1=Al:
(4.5)
4.4 Optimal Project for Decision Maker under Collective Sig-
nals
Now consider the situationwhere the decisionmaker knows the realized values of both
signals, x and y. If the decision maker observes signals that are inconsistent: x = x
and y = y0 where  , 0, then d = 1=2. Therefore, the decision maker strictly prefers
status quo S to both extreme projects L and R.
Fact 4.2. If the decision maker has inconsistent signals: x = x and y = y0 where  , 0,
then she chooses p = S.
We assume that the following condition (4.6) hold.
Assumption 4.1.
1 +
1   

2
> A: (4.6)
Under this assumption, the decision maker is willing to take an extreme project
when she has consistent signals (x; y) = (x; y):  Pr(0jx; y)A0 >  1.
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4.5 Benchmark: The Situation where the Investigation is Im-
possible
In this section, we study the situation in which the decision maker cannot gather his
private signal y. Under this assumption, our communication procedure is essentially
equivalent to the following communication procedure.
1. Nature randomly draws a state  2  with probability 1=2 each, and the expert
observes a signal x 2 X privately.
2. The expert sends a message m 2 X to the decision maker depending on x.
3. The decision maker chooses a project p 2 P and the game ends.
After receiving x = x, the expert’s posterior belief is derived as follows:
Prob(0jx)  e(0jx) =
8>>><>>>:1    for 
0 = ;
 for 0 , :
(4.7)
If the expert’s strategy is the truth-telling strategy: m = x,3 then the receiver’s
posterior belief coincides with the expert’s belief: d(0jm = x) = e(0jx). Let %ix be
the preference relation of i when she (or he) possesses a signal x. Similarly, we denote
by ix the strict preference relation of i when she (or he) possesses a signal x. Since
Prob(ljxl) > 1=2 and Prob(rjxr) > 1=2, we have
L;S ixl R and R; S ixr L: (4.8)
If S %dxl L and S %
d
xr R, then S is always the optimal project for the decision maker.
Therefore, there exists a truth-telling equilibrium where the decision maker chooses S
regardless of the expert’s message. Moreover, it is obvious that L exl R and R dxr L.
Hence, if L %dxl S and R %
d
xr S, then there exists a truth-telling equilibrium where the
decision maker chooses L when she receives m = xl and chooses R when she receives
m = xr. The following Lemma 4.1 summarizes the above.
Lemma 4.1. In the situation where the investigation is impossible, there exists a truth-telling
equilibrium if the following (4.9) or (4.10) holds.
maxf1=Al; 1=Arg  : (4.9)
  minf1=Al; 1=Arg: (4.10)
3Potentially, the expert’s report could be random.
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The condition (4.9) represents a case in which S %dx L;R for all x 2 fxl; xrg. The
condition (4.10) represents a case in which L %dxl S and R %
d
xr S.
Next, we show that there exists a truth-telling equilibrium when 1=Ar <  < 1=Al or
1=Al <  < 1=Ar. Suppose that 1=Ar <  < 1=Al, In this case, R dxr S and S dxl L. By
(4.8), it is obvious that the expert who observes x = xl has no incentive to deceive the
decision maker into choosing R. Hence, if R %exr S, then the expert has no incentive to
deviate from the truth-telling strategy. Similarly, in the case where 1=Al <  < 1=Ar, if
L %exl S, then the expert has no incentive to deviate from the truth-telling strategy. The
following Lemma 4.2 is a summary of the above.
Lemma 4.2. In the situation where the investigation is impossible, there exists a truth-telling
equilibrium if the following (4.11) or (4.12) holds.
1=Ar <  < 1=Al and   1=Bl: (4.11)
1=Al <  < 1=Ar and   1=Br: (4.12)
Now, suppose that 1=Ar <  < 1=Al and 1=Bl < . In this case, we have R dxr S,
S dxl L and S exr R. This implies that the expert who observes x = xr has an incentive to
deceive the decisionmaker into choosing S. Thismeans that there exists no truth-telling
equilibrium in this case. Similarly, in the case where 1=Al <  < 1=Ar and 1=Br < ,
there exists no truth telling equilibrium. Based on the above observations, we have the
following Proposition 4.1.
Proposition 4.1. In the situation where the investigation is impossible, there exists no truth-
telling equilibrium if and only if the following (4.13) or (4.14) holds.
1=Ar <  < 1=Al and 1=Bl < : (4.13)
1=Al <  < 1=Ar and 1=Br < : (4.14)
From now on, we assume (4.13) in order to analyze how the receiver’s investigation
could facilitate communication
Assumption 4.2.
1=Ar <  < 1=Al and 1=Bl < : (, R dxr S; S dxl L and S exr R:)
Assumption 4.2 is consistent with Assumption 4.1, since  > 2=f2 + (1   )2g.
4.6 Informative Communication under Information Gather-
ing
In this section, we shows that the decisionmaker’s investigation facilitates information
transmission.
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4.6.1 Truth-telling equilibria where m1 = x
First we focus on a strategy profile where the decision maker asks for advice at stage 3.
Proposition 4.2. There exists a truth telling equilibrium where m1 = x if and only if the
following condition (4.15), (4.16) or (4.17) holds.
minf1   2Ar   2(1   ; (1   )(Al   2)g > C: (4.15)
1   2Ar   2(1   ) > C > (1   )(Al   2) and,
Bl  (1   )(1= + Br): (4.16)
(1   )(Al   2) > C > 1   2Ar   2(1   ) and,
Bl 2 (2=(1   ); 1=2   2(1   )=): (4.17)
Fix the expert’s strategy at stage 3 as m1 = x. The decision maker’s optimal investi-
gation decision at stage 4 is as follows.
Lemma 4.3.  Given m1 = xl, the decision maker gathers information at stage 4 if and
only if C < 1   2Ar   2(1   ).
 Given m1 = xr, the decision maker gathers information at stage 4 if and only if C <
(1   )(Al   2).
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.
From this lemma, if C > maxf1  2Ar   2(1  ); (1  )(Al   2)g, then the decision
maker does not gather information at stage 4. Moreover, under Assumption 4.2, if
the decision maker does not gather information, then the expert’s has an incentive to
deceive the decision maker into choosing Swhen he observes x = xr. This implies that
there exists no truth-telling equilibrium where m1 = x.
If minf1   2Ar   2(1   ); (1   )(Al   2)g > C, then the decision maker always
gathers information at stage 4. By Assumption 4.1, the decision maker chooses the
extreme project when she has consistent signals: pˆd = L when x = xl and y = yl, and
pˆd = R when x = xr and y = yr. Moreover, she chooses the status quo when signals
are inconsistent: pˆd = S when x =  and y = y0 where  , 0. Hence, in this case,
the expert has no incentive to deceive the decision maker. Therefore, there exists a
truth-telling equilibrium where m1 = x.
If 1   2Ar   2(1   ) > C > (1   )(Al   2), then the decision maker gathers
information at stage 4 when m1 = xl, and does not gather information when m1 = xr.
Consider the situationwhere the expert observes x = xl. In this case, it is obvious that he
has no incentive to deceive the decisionmaker since if he does, then the decisionmaker
chooses R without gathering information. Next, suppose that the expert observes
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x = xr. By sending m1 = xr, the expert obtains the expected payo of  Bl. By sending
m1 = xl, the expert obtains the expected payo of
f(1   )  ( 1) +   0g + (1   )f  ( Br) + (1   )  ( 1)g =  (1   )(1 + Br):
Therefore, in the situation where (1   )(Ar   2) > C > (1   )(Al   2), there exists a
truth telling equilibrium where m1 = x if and only if Bl  (1   )(1= + Br).
If (1   )(Al   2) > C > 1   2Ar   2(1   ), then the decision maker gathers
information at stage 4 when m1 = xr, and does not gather information when m1 = xl.
Consider the situation where the expert observes x = xl. In this case, by sending the
message xl, the expert obtains the expected payo of  1. By sending xr, the expert
observes  (1   2)   (1   )Bl. If  1   (1   2)   (1   )Bl, then the expert has no
incentive of misrepresentation. Next, consider the situation where the expert observes
xr. In this case, by sending the message xr, the expert obtains the expected payo of
 2(1   )   2Bl. By sending xl, the expert observes  1. If  2(1   )   2Bl   1, then
the expert has no incentive of misrepresentation.
Finally, we consider the receiver’s behavior at stage 2. Take the expert’s behavior
at stage 5, which is o the equilibrium path, as babbling message. It is obvious that the
decision maker has no incentive to deviate from the given strategy. Moreover, given an
arbitrary belief, for each type of the expert, if the other type of the expert sends babbling
message, then sending babbling is always optimal for him. This implies that the given
strategy profile satisfies the sequential rationality under the given belief system that
satisfies the consistency of beliefs. Summarizing the above, we have Proposition 4.2.
4.6.2 Truth-Telling Equilibria where m2 = x
We now focus on a truth telling equilibrium where the decision maker asks for advice
at stage 5 and m2 = x.
Proposition 4.3. There exists a truth telling equilibrium where m2 = x if and only if
C  f1 + Al   4(1   )   2(Al + Ar)g=2: (4.18)
By Proposition 4.1, under Assumption 4.2, if the decision maker does not gather
information at stage 4, then the expert never reveals his private information. Moreover,
if the decision maker gathers information at stage 4 and the expert reveals his private
information at stage 5, then the decision maker chooses the extreme project if and only
if she possesses consistent signals: x = x and y = y. Therefore, if the decision maker
gathers information at stage 4, then the truth-telling at stage 5 could be optimal for the
expert. Hence, given the expert strategy at stage 5 as m2 = x, if gathering information
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at stage 4 is optimal for the decision maker, then there exists a truth-telling equilibrium
where m2 = x. Otherwise there exists no equilibrium where m2 = x.
If the decision maker gathers information at stage 4, then she obtains the expected
payo of
 C + [(1   )2  0 + 2(1   )  ( 1) + 2  ( Al)]=2
+ [(1   )2  0 + 2(1   )  ( 1) + 2  ( Ar)]=2
=   C   2(1   )   2(Al + Ar)=2:
Otherwise, the decision maker obtains the expected payo of
[f(1   )  ( 1) +   ( Al)g + f(1   )  0 +   ( 1)g]=2
=  (1 + Al)=2:
Hence, gathering information is optimal for the decision maker if and only if C 
f1 + Al   4(1   )   2(Al + Ar)g=2. Summarizing the above, we have Proposition 4.3.
This equilibrium is supported by the expert’s o-the-path behavior: if the decision
maker asks for advice at stage 3, then the expert sends the babbling message. If m1 is a
babbling message, then the decision maker has no incentive to ask for advice at stage 3.
4.7 Conclusion
Consider the situation where (4.15) and (4.18) hold. Then, the decision maker’s equi-
librium payos are the same in Section 4.6.1 and 4.6.2 since in each of them the expert
conveys his private information and the decision maker conducts the investigation
regardless of the message from the expert.
Next consider the situation where (4.16) and (4.18) hold. This could be occurred
when  is small enough. On the one hand under the both equilibria in Proposition 4.2
and Proposition 4.3, the expert tells the truth. On the other hand, under the equilibrium
in Proposition 4.2, the decision maker’s investigation decision depends on the message
from the expert. This creates the eect of the cost reduction. Hence, the decision maker
can obtain the higher ex ante expected payo under the equilibrium in Proposition 4.2
than that under the equilibrium in Proposition 4.3.4
Finally, consider the situation where (4.18) holds but any of (4.15)–(4.17) does not
hold, e.g., maxf1   2Ar   2(1   ; (1   )(Al   2)g > C > minf1   2Ar   2(1   ; (1  
)(Al   2)g, f1 + Al   4(1   )   2(Al + Ar)g=2 > C, and Bl are large enough. This
could be occurred when Al  2, Ar  1=, and  is small. In this case, if the decision
maker asks advice for the expert at stage 3, then the expert does not convey his private
4The same can be said when (4.17) and (4.18) hold.
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information. On the other hand, under the equilibrium in Proposition 4.3, the decision
maker never asks for advice at stage 3. Then, the expert to believes that the decision
maker conduct the investigation at stage 4. Hence, the expert is willing to tell the truth.
Appendix
Appendix 4.A Proof of Lemma 4.3
Proof. Consider the situation where x = xl. Then, Pri(ljxl) = 1   . By Fact 4.1, if the
decision maker conducts the investigation at stage 4, then she obtains the expected
payo of
(1   )[(1   )  0 +   ( 1)] + [(1   )  ( 1) +   ( Ar)]   C
=  2(1   )   2Ar   C: (4.19)
Otherwise, she obtains  1. Therefore, the decision maker conducts the investigation if
and only if C < 1   2Ar   2(1   ).
Next, we consider the situation where x = xr. In this case, Pri(rjxr) = 1   . Fact 4.1
implies that if the decisionmaker conducts the investigation at stage 4, then she obtains
the expected payo of
(1   )[(1   )  0 +   ( 1)] + [(1   )  ( 1) +   ( Al)]   C
=  2(1   )   2Al   C: (4.20)
Otherwise she obtains  Al. Therefore, the decision maker conducts the investigation
if and only if C < (1   )(Al   2). 
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